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NOTES
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AWARDS BY THE RAILROAD'
ADJUSTMENT BOARD*
TrE railroad industry has been the laboratory for several attempts by
Congress' to provide an expedient system for the adjustment of labor dis-
putes arising out of the interpretation of collective bargaining contracts.
The strong, highly developed trade unions and the national railroad systems
provide the framework for a machinery of self-regulation whereby these
contract grievances can be solved by the industry independently of the jtdi-
cial process. The present National Railroad Adjustment Board 2 has operated
to remove such disputes so completely from the surveillance of the courts
that railroad interests now demand that additional techniques of judicial
review be superimposed upon the procedure of the Adjustment Board,
The statutory procedure encompassing the Railroad Adjustment Board
sets up a hierarchy of negotiation between the unions and the carriers to
facilitate the settlement of controversies. The Railway Labor Act requires
that both parties attempt at the outset to compromise all grievances by direct
negotiation. 4 If this private negotiation proves unsuccessful, the controversies
* Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F. (2d) 235 (App. D. C. 1941).
1. The singular success of the bi-partisan adjustment boards in operation dluring
the period of federal control of the railroads, 1918-1920, inspired the subsequent adjust-
ment machinery of the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 STAT. 470 (1920), and the Rail-
way Labor Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 578 (1926), 45 U. S. C. § 153 (1940). The Railway
Labor Act as amended in 1934, 48 STAT. 1185, 45 U. S. C. § 151 (1940) (hereafter
cited by section number only) is an example of legislative eclecticism, for it interweaves
techniques of adjustment, arbitration and mediation into a workable system of labor
relations. Labor relations during the war are detailed in HINEs, WAR HISTORY OF
AmaucA, RAILROADS (1928) 152-91; WVOLF, THE RAILROAD LABOR BOARD (1927) 47-57.
The weaknesses of post-war legislation are summarized in Garrison, Tie National Rail-
road Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 50-
76; SPENCER, THE NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD (1938) 2-16; Comment
(1935) 29 ILL. L. Rav. 789.
2. The National Railroad Adjustment Board was created by the 1934 amendments
to the Railway Labor Act of 1926. No attempt will be made here to examine the pro-
visions of the Act dealing with the National Mediation Board, the arbitration scheme
or the emergency boards. It must be emphasized, however, that jurisdiction of the Ad-
justment Board is limited to controversies over the application and interpretation of
collective labor agreements, while the National Mediation Board handles disputes involv-
ing wages or changes in agreements. There is, of course, a twilight zone between the
interpretation of existing rules of an agreement and the formulation of additional rules.
See SPENCER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 30.
3. The position of the carriers was presented to the Attorney General's Committee
on Administrative Procedure by Mr. John Dickinson, General Solicitor, Pennsylvania
Railroad. See Transcript of Proceedings, June 26, 1940, pp. 3-81.
4. Disputes cannot be submitted to the Adjustment Board until they have been
"handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the car-
rier designated to handle such disputes." RAILWAY LABoR AcT, § 3, First (i).
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may be submitted by either or both disputants to the proper division of the
Board.5 The three major divisions of the bi-partisan Adjustment Board
consist of five representatives of the railroads and five representatives of the
brotherhoods. In the event of an even vote an impartial referee may be
appointed to resolve the deadlock.s The Adjustment Board is given no power
to enforce an award and, if losing carriers refuse to comply voluntarily with
its terms, a special judicial procedure permits employees to bring enforce-
ment suits within a two year period. Since the statute specifies that the
findings of the Board shall be merely prima facie evidence,7 the enforcement
suit amounts to a trial de novo.
But an employees' enforcement suit is the only method of obtaining judicial
review of awards by the Board. Evidently Congress recognized that the
ability to enforce an award is inherent in the power of management, for
the statute provides no method by which winning carriers can judicially
enforce awards against employees. Furthermore, the statute affords no
opportunity for either losing carriers or losing employees to institute a judi-
cial suit to review the awards of the Adjustment Board. As a result, Board
awards are seldom subject to court scrutiny.8 For, rather than pursuing
judicial remedies to enforce awards, the railway brotherhoods almost always
prefer to secure carrier compliance by resorting to economic strength - the
threat to strike. If a strike should occur, public opinion ordinarily would
support the decision of the Adjustment Board. Losing carriers have there-
5. The Adjustment Board is composed of four divisions. each of which is bi-partiean
and operates independently of the others. The jurisdiction of a division is limitcd to a
special class of employees; Division I: train engineers, firemen, conductors and yard
employees; Division II: skilled craft and shop workers; Division III: clerical and
maintenance employees; Division IV: employees of water carriers. During the peri@al
1934-1937, 5,364 claims were submitted to Division 1, 216 to Division II, 671 to Division
III and 14 to Division IV. SpExcE. op. cit. supra note 1, at 49. In 1940, Division I w.as
three years behind in its calendar. See FINAL REORT oF A'roRvn- GI:uML's COb!t-
flTTEE Ox ADmImsTRATIVE PRocFDtRE (1941) 188.
6. The Act specifies that upon a deadlock, the division shall select a neutral person
as referee. If a referee is not selected within ten days, either party or any member of the
division may certify that fact to the Mediation Board, which must then select a referee.
§3, First (I).
7. In addition the statute attempts to minimize the practical burdens of litigation
by granting employees a choice of venue, exemption from payment of costs, and the
recovery of attorneys' fees if the action is successful. § 3, First (p).
8. Diligent inquiry of reported cases has discovered only six statutory enforcement
suits. Estes v. Union Terminal Co., 89 F. (2d) 768 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937) (avard en-
forced since affected employees had actual notice of submission); System Federation
No. 59 v. Louisiana & A. Ry. Co., 119 F. (2d) 509 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941), ccrt. dcnied,
62 Sup. Ct 108 (U. S. 1941) (dismissal of suit for lack of Board's jurisdiction because
dispute not pending when Act passed); Cook v. Des Moines Union Ry. Co., 16 F.
Supp. 810 (S. D. Iowa 1936) (award enforced); Smith v. Texas & New Orleans IL R.
Co., 32 F. Supp. 1013 (W. D. La. 1940) (suit dismissed because claim compromised
between union and carrier after Board award but before Board order of compliance);
Thomas v. Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co., 118 F. (2d) 75 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) (suit
dismissed on same ground); Atlantic Coast Line v. Pope, 119 F. (2d) 39 (C. C. A. 4th,
1941) (award set aside as claim had lapsed under a system board appeal limitation).
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fore been forced to accept the awards as final. The railroads have made
strategic attempts to escape this impasse by seeking independent judicial
determination of the validity of the awards of the Board.
Recently, in Washington Terminal Company v. Boswell2 a carrier at-
tempted to secure a declaratory judgment of its rights under a labor contract
after an unfavorable award by the Railroad Adjustment Board. Claiming
the right to perform special terminal switchwork, previously handled by train
crews of tenant lines, certain employees and the labor unions,10 after unsuc-
cessful private conference, submitted the controversy to the Adjustment
Board. After a preliminary deadlock of the Board, the appointment of a
referee resulted in an award for the employees. Before the statutory two
year enforcement period had lapsed," the losing carrier brought an inde-
pendent declaratory judgment suit in the District Court for the District
of Columbia.1 2 The Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting,1 3 sustained
the dismissal of the complaint by the District Court. The nature of the
case presented the necessary elements for declaratory relief ;14 but since the
granting of a declaratory judgment is a matter of judicial discretion, the
court held that to allow such a suit would cripple the operation of the special
statutory adjustment system.' 5
The relation of judicial remedies and judicial review to the statutory pro-
cedure of the Railroad Adjustment Board depends in large part upon the
determination of whether a claimant in a contract dispute has an initial
option to pursue his claim, either through the adjustment machinery or by
direct suit on the contract. If the jurisdiction of the Board is wholly volun-
tary, then it may be said that by submitting the dispute to the Adjustment
9. Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F. (2d) 235 (App. D. C. 1941).
10. Because the Adjustment Board refuses to accept jurisdiction over submissions
of individuals, claims of employees must be carried to the Board by the railway broth-
erhoods. For example, in McDermott v. New York Central R. R., 32 F. Supp. 873 (S. D.
N. Y. 1940), an employee brought a direct judicial action only after the Order of Railroad
Telegraphers had refused to back his claim and after the Adjustment Board had rejected
his individual submission.
11. The court in the principal case posed but did not decide the question of whether
a losing carrier could bring a suit for declaratory judgment after the expiration of the
two year enforcement period. It seems clear that after two years the employees' right
of action under an Adjustment Board award vanishes, and that such a suit by a carrier
should be dismissed as an academic controversy.
12. The Washington Terminal Company sought both an adjudication of rights under
the original labor contract and a declaration that the Board award was void. Since the
effect of either theory of the suit would be to nullify the award, the court treated the
declaratory judgment action as essentially a suit to review the award of the Adjustment
Board. 124 F. (2d) 235, 239 (App. D. C. 1941).
13. Stressing the informality of the Board's procedure, dissenting Judge Stephens
stated that since the adjustment system was not an exclusive remedy allowance of the
declaratory judgment suit would not interfere with a "special statutory method" of ell-
forcement.
14. See BORCHARi, DEcLAAT RO Y JUDGMENTS (2d ed. 1941) 25-56.
15. A declaratory judgment should not be granted if it would interfere 1with a special
statutory remedy intended by the legislature to be exclusive. See BORCHAIW, DECLAIRA-
TORY JuDGmENTS (2d ed. 1941) 342.
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Board the claimant had waived his right to judicial remedies.1 0 But if it
were compulsory to exhaust the statutory adjustment remedy before resorting
to litigation, the traditional concepts of administrative law would probably
require that the losing part), before the Board be assured judicial review to
satisfy the mandate of due process.17 After the principal case had been argued,
the Supreme Court held in Moore v. Illinois Central Railroad's that the
jurisdiction of the Railroad Adjustment Board was merely a voluntary alter-
native to direct suit on the labor contract. Thus, when a dispute arises each
party has the choice between the judicial process and the adjustment system.19
The unique procedure of the Board and the contractual nature of the dispute
suggest that Congress intended the Board's jurisdiction to be alternative. "^a
Such an interpretation does not hamper the operation of the Act, for the
delay and expense of litigation will preclude formal trial of a large per-
centage of the thousands of disputes now handled by adjustment.
When one party, exercising the original option of jurisdiction, submits
a controversy to the Adjustment Board, it. is not settled whether the other
party is bound by the choice, or whether courts will allow the non-submit-
ting party to circumvent the jurisdiction of the Board by instituting a judi-
cial action. Since the statute provides that either or both disputants may
submit a dispute to the Board, 21 it would seem that single submissions are
16. See Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Brady, 23798 U. S. 448 (1933); Brady v. ICC,
43 F. (2d) 847 (N. D. NV. Va. 1930), aff'd. 283 LT. S. F04 (1931) (election of remedy
under Interstate Commerce Act).
17. See Anniston Manufacturing Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 337, 345 (1937). Courts
recognize the advisability of leaving the determination and regulation of intricate eco-
nomic problems to administrative agencies specified by the legiqlatures. Depending upon
the nature of the statutory provision, courts treat the jurisdiction of administrative bodies
as "exclusive," thus making the administrative remedy compulsory, or as one of "prior
resort." requiring an exhaustion of the administrative remedy before resort to the courts.
The third category, "alternative" jurisdiction, does not require the petitioner to under-
take administrative proceedings as a condition precedent to direct court action. For a
valuable discussion of the jurisdictional relation of courts and administrative bodies, see
Comment (193S) 51 Huv. L. REv. 1251.
18. 312 U. S. 630 (1941). The same result wvas reached earlier in Evans v. Louis-
ville & Nashville R. R., 191 Ga. 395, 12 S. E. (2d) 611 (1940), (1941) 39 M ncu. L
Rl'v. 1408. In Adams v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R R., 121 F. (2d) 803 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1941), the original opinion holding the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board to
be exclusive was withdrawn and revised after the decision in Moore v. Illinois Central
Railroad.
19. If the adjustment proceeding were held to be exclusive, some judicial review
would seem necessary to safeguard the interests of non-union employees. At present it
is the practice of the Adjustment Board to deadlock and thus deny its jurisdiction to
claims not sponsored by the railway brotherhoods.
20. Traditionally claims based on contract rights may be presented in court despite
an administrative remedy. Barone v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 260 N. Y. 410, 183 N. E.
900 (1933); Chicago City Ry. v. Chicago & W. I. R. R., 331 II. 151, 162 N. E. 852
(192S). For further discussion see Comment (1933) 51 thxnv. L. REv. 1251, 1257.
21. Section 3, First (i). Although either party may submit the dispute to the Board,
there has been only one instance of carrier submission. Monograph of Attorney Gcncr-
al's Committee on Administrathe Procedure, Pt. 4, SEtr. Doe. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1941) 11.
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sufficient to invoke the Board's jurisdiction. The grant of judicial relief
to a non-submitting party who objects to the adjustment proceeding would
thus produce the confusion and expense which result from concurrent liti-
gation of the same issues in separate tribunals.22 It is clear, however, that
if both parties join the submission of a contract dispute to the Board, or if
the non-submitting party appears and participates in the proceeding, neither
party should be allowed to resort to the courts during the course of nego-
tiations. Under this theory, the employer in the Washington Terminal case
was committed to the statutory process at least until the Board made its
award. But the central issue of the Washington Terminal case was the right
of the party who appeared before the Adjustment Board and lost the award
to secure judicial review independently of the statutory enforcement suit.
Undoubtedly the draftsmen of the Act intended by means of the enforce-
ment suit to assure judicial review of those controversial awards with which
the carriers did not voluntarily comply. But the refusal of labor to utilize
the enforcement procedure,2 3 however unfortunate, does not necessarily justify
the creation of additional opportunities for judicial review. Since losing
parties are granted no means of instituting judicial review, the employee
enforcement suits 24 could be regarded as the equivalent of management's
power to enforce without judicial aid. If awards are enforced by employees
through strike threats, employers are merely required, as employees always
have been under the Railway Labor Act, to accept unfavorable awards of
the Adjustment Board as final. But if added protection by judicial review
were necessary, comprehensive statutory amendment, rather than judicial
initiative, should supply the relief. Allowance of an independent suit for a
declaratory judgment would induce a race to the courts after an award had
been made- employees seeking the advantages of enforcement suits, and
the employer seeking the procedure of an independent action. Furthermore,
parties would be less inclined to compromise and adjust their differences
22. On the other hand, if the Adjustment Board decided not to exercise jurisdiction
over a dispute unless both parties agreed to the submission, the adjustment machinery
would be kept wholly voluntary. Such a holding would not materially limit the Board's
jurisdiction, for at present if either party is anxious to avoid the Adjustment Board, they
can take the jurisdictional initiative and choose the desired forum.
23. See supra note 8. For an analysis of labor's distrust of the courts, see Rice, Col-
lective Labor Agreements in American Law (1931) 44 HARV. L. REV. 572.
24. The provisions for the enforcement of the Adjustment Board awards are not
unique in administrative law. Compare enforcement suit provisions under the Interstate
Commerce Act, 34 STAT. 590 (1906) as amended by 36 STAT. 554 (1910) and 41 STAT.
491 (1920), 49 U. S. C. § 16 (1), (2) (1940); the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38
STAT. 722 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §§ 49, 50 (1940) ; the Packers and Stockyards Act, 42
STAT. 168 (1921), 7 U. S. C. §222 (1940). Courts have refused to set aside rulings of
the Federal Trade Commission on the ground that such orders have no legal effect until
enforcement proceedings are instituted by the Commission. FTC v. Claire Furnace Co.,
274 U. S. 160 (1927) ; FTC v. Maynard Coal Co., 22 F. (2d) 873 (App. D. C. 1927).
In Cook v. Des Moines Union Ry. Co., 16 F. Supp. 810, 813 (S. D. Iowa 1936), the
same reasoning was applied to awards of the Railroad Adjustment Board. The analogy
of these cases as precedent for the Adjustment Board awards, however, is imperfect
since the threat to strike provides an extra-legal technique of enforcement.
[Vol, 51
NOTES
in early negotiation if a subsequent, full-dress judicial proceeding were avail-
able to the party who lost before the Board.
The voluntary nature of proceedings before the Adjustment Board pru-
vides a machinery comparable to a well-developed system of industrial arbi-
tration.2 5 The steady growth of commercial and industrial arbitration stems
from a realization that technical contract disputes can best be handled by
designated non-judicial tribunals familiar with practices and problems of
the industry and able to act speedily at minimum expense. The same con-
siderations are paramount in railway labor contract disputes. Arbitration
awards are accorded the same legal effect as a court judgment if the hearing
and decision of the arbitrators conforn to provisions of the arbitration agree-
ment.20 Arbitral proceedings are subject to procedural and jurisdictional
attack, but the decisions are enforceable by courts without review of the
merits of the decision.2 7 In this respect the courts have already indicated
that awards of the Railroad Adjustment Board may be collaterally attached
for lack of jurisdiction2 or for lack of proper notice to interested parties. - 3
By analogy to arbitration law, it may be argued that parties voluntarily
invoking the jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board waive their right to judi-
cial review of the merits of awards.
Since the procedure of the Railroad Adjustment Board is more informal
than that specified by arbitration laws, it would seem advisable to formalize
the Board's internal procedure in order to safeguard awards from possible
judicial attack.30 The Adjustment Board has developed unique rules of
procedure governing the nature of submissions, the conduct of hearings, and
the methods of proof. Submission of disputes is not characterized by tra-
ditional responsive pleadings31 Instead controversies are referred to the
25. See Kellor, Coordinate Mcdiation and Arbitration in Labor Relations (1941)
5 ARB. J. 239.
26. The United States Arbitration Act, 43 STAT. 8S5, 9 U. S. C. § 9 (1940), sleci-
fies that if the agreement provides for judicial enforcement courts must grant upon the
petition of any party an order confirming the award unless the award is vacated, modified
or corrected as prescribed in the Act.
27. Everett v. Brown, 120 Misc. 349, 193 N. Y. Supp. 4t2 (1923). Fur a discus-
sion of the grounds upon which an arbitration award may be attacked, ECe KELLO., Anol-
TRATION IN AcTioN (1941) 167-77. The United States Arbitration Act, 43 STmT. 5,
9 U. S. C. §§ 10, 11 (1940), allows the vacation of awards chiefly upon grounds of
fraud, mistake or misconduct of the arbitrators.
28. Stephenson v. New Orleans & N. E. R. R. Co., 1SU Miss. 147, 177 So. 50)
(1937). Contra: Railroad Yardmasters v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. R. Co., 39 F. Supp.
876 (N. D. Ohio 1940).
29. Nord v. Griffin, 86 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 7l, 1936), cert. denied. 300 U. S. (,73
(1937) ; Brand v. Pennsylvania R. R., 1 Prentice-Hall 1941 Labor Serv. T4033 (E. D. Pa.
1939) ; Estes v. Union Terminal Co., S9 F. (2d) 76S (C. C. A. Sth, 1937).
30. Since the standards of administrative procedure required by due process have
not been clearly defined by the courts, arbitration procedure provides a useful norm. As
long as arbitration remains a voluntary remedy, probably any procedure specified in the
arbitration agreement which insures a "fair" hearing will be upheld. See STLmTrs, Com-
=mcIAL ARBITRATio, (1930) 422-519 passimw.
31. Monograph of Attorney General's Committee on Administrati 'e Procedure, Pt.
4, SEN. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 12. In arbitration law the written
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Board as joint submissions8 2 or as ex parte submissions, in which both
parties present arguments and facts simultaneously without knowledge of
the position of the other party. Such pleadings fail to narrow the issues,
and in the Board's First Division, which limits the proof to allegations con-
tained in the submissions, often result in unfairness. 3 At hearings before the
Board both parties present oral arguments, which are followed by a cross
examination of the parties by Board members. Hearings are conducted in-
formally, the present theory being that adequate presentation of facts and
issues is assured by the bi-partisan structure of the Board. The major
difference between arbitration and Adjustment Board procedure lies in the
presentation of evidence. Although courts have upheld arbitration awards
based on hearsay evidence,34 the use of witnesses and depositions character-
izes the majority of arbitral proceedings. 35 Nearly all the awards of the
Railway Adjustment Board are based on hearsay evidence presented by the
parties without benefit of cross-examination of witnesses.8 0 Actually, how-
ever, few disputes involve pivotal factual issues, and both labor and carrier
representatives approve the present, simplu method of eliciting the facts.87
Substantial reform of the Board's procedure will probably have to await
Congressional action, for its bi-partisan membership prevents the Adjust-
ment Board from achieving effective rules of practice. On certain basic
procedural issues the representatives of labor and the carriers are in sharp
disagreement, the resulting deadlocks leaving these questions undecided. For
example, the various divisions of the Board consistently deadlock over the
issue of granting jurisdiction to claims asserted by individuals38 Since im-
partial referees are only appointed to resolve deadlocks over the merits of
disputes,39 claims not sponsored by the railway brotherhoods are uniformly
rejected. In addition, deadlocks have prevented a determination of whether
notice should be given to non-submitting employees affected by a seniority
dispute. In three instances of collateral attack upon seniority awards, courts
agreement to arbitrate an existing controversy is termed a submission. The required
content and form of the submission varies according to the controlling statute. Generally
the submission includes statements of the various claims in issue and the remedy sought.
See KELLOR, ARBITRATION IN ACTION (1941) 58-66.
32. Joint submissions include submissions in which the parties stipulate the facts
and specific issues and those in which the parties state their differences in a single docu-
ment.
33. See Transcript of Hearing before the Attorney General's Committee on Admin-
istrative Procedure, June 26, 1940, p. 30.
34. See Dana v. Dana, 260 Mass. 460, 157 N. E. 623 (1927); Koepke v. Liethen
Grain Co., 205 Wis. 75, 236 N. W. 544 (1931).
35. See tEL.OR, ARBITRATION IN AcrioN (1941) 101.
36. See Monograph of Attorney General's Committce on Administrative Procedure,
Pt. 4, SEN. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 13.
37. See id. at 14.
38. See id. at 7.
39. The National Mediation Board was recently advised by the Attorney General
that it could appoint a referee to resolve jurisdictional deadlocks of the Adjustment
Board, although the question did not concern the merits of a dispute. 39 Ors. ATrrY.
GEN., No. 113, Feb. 19, 1940.
[Vol. 51
NOTES
have declared that such an award made without adequate notice to interested
parties is unenforceable. An order was issued in two of the cases40 enjoining
enforcement while in the third case 4 ' the court enforced the award on the
gTound that the objecting party had actual notice of the pending dispute.
Although the Adjustment Board has ignored these judicial decisions, con-
tinued nullification of seniority awards may force the adoption of some
reasonable method of notification. Substitution of a non-partisan tribunal
for the present Adjustment Board would go far toward solving many of
the current procedural problems. But, as the success of the adjustment
system depends upon the willingness of the parties to invoke the jurisdiction
of the Board and accept its decisions, a non-partisan board would be useless
until actively supported by both the railroads and labor.
As other industries emerge from the transitional stage of union organiza-
tion and recognition, the National Railroad Adjustment Board may provide
an effective model upon whid to base stable, mature systems of labor
relations. Moreover, the exigencies of production in a wartime economy
accentuate the importance of available techniques of labor negotiation and
mediation- as a useful means of avoiding the waste and delay of labor
strikes. The present Railroad Adjustment Board, however imperfect in
detail, has proved remarkably successful in preventing interruptions of rail-
road transportation due to labor disputes. Reforms in its structure and pro-
cedure should emanate from Congress and not from the courts.
40. Nord v. Griffin, 86 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), cert. dcncd, 30 U. S. 073
(1937) ; Brand v. Pennsylvania R. R, 1 Prentice-Hall 1941 Labor Serv. F,4033 (E. D.
Pa. 1939).
41. Estes v. Union Terminal Co., 89 F. (2d) 70 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937). In a cum-
curring opinion Judge Hutcheson stated that notice to affected employees vas not nmccs-
sary since "neither the employee favored, nor those disfavored, by the carrier, have indi-
vidual legal rights which they can press against the carrier as rights personal to them-
selves, apart from the collective agreement under which they work." Id. at 774.
42. The procedures for settling wartime labor disputes under the National War
Labor Board, recently established by executive order, are similar to thoZe of the Rail-
way Labor Act. Parties are directed to utilize at the outset direct negotiation or existing
systems of adjustment. If the dispute remains unsettled after negotiation and concilia-
tion, the War Labor Board is empowered to determine finally the merits of the dispute.
It should be noted that the War Labor Board does not supersede the Railroad Adjust-
ment Board but merely operates as a body of last resort after the machinery set up by
the Railwvay Labor Act has failed to settle the cvntroversy. See N. Y. Times, Jan. 13,
1942, p. 14, col. 4.
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ALLOCATION OF RISK BETWEEN MARINE AND WAR INSURER*
THE outbreak of war presents the troublesome problem of determining
whether a particular marine loss should be borne by the marine or by the
war insurer. Although originally both types of risks were covered by the
same policy, 'it early became customary to except from the marine policy
any liability for war risks by warranting the insurance policy "free of capture
and seizure and all consequences of hostilities and warlike operations."' In
time of war, the shipowner must protect himself against war risks either
by having the immunity clause deleted, or by insuring against them in a
separate policy. But when two separate policies, issued by different under-
writers, are employed to cover the shipowner an issue often arises as to
whether a marine loss is a "consequence of warlike operations" and therefore
excluded from the marine coverage.
2
In a recent English case, Yorkshire Dale Steamship Company v. Minister
of War Transport,3 the steamship Coxwald was engaged in the admittedly
"warlike operation" of carrying oil from one war base to another. No lights
were being used for fear of attack, and visibility was limited. Although she
had been following the course prescribed by the commodore of the convoy, an
unexplained and undetected tidal set carried the ship several miles off her
course, and she grounded on a reef. The English Court of Appeals, rejecting
a lower court contention that a vessel engaged in a warlike operation and
damaged by sea perils must necessarily be deemed to have been injured as a
consequence of the warlike operation,4 held that the "proximate cause" of
* Yorkshire Dale S. S. Co. v. Minister of War Transport, 3 All E. R. 214 (C. A.
1941).
1. Ancient forms of marine insurance policies in Britain enumerate among mari-
time risks many perils of war. See I MAGENS, AN EsSAY ON INSURANCES. The British
have usually adhered to the old form of marine policy, introduced at an early date and
adopted by statute, 35 Gao. III, c. 63 (1795). The Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Etm'w.
VII, c. 41, § 3, classified perils of war, together with perils of the sea, as maritime risks.
But in 1898, Lloyd's policy was modified to exclude: "capture, seizure, and detention,
and the consequences thereof or of any attempt thereat, piracy excepted, and also from
the consequences of hostilities or warlike operations, whether before or after declaration
of war." This is known as the F. C. & S. clause. For the legal effect of this clatse
see (1920) 65 SoL. J. 40, 41.
2. Loss by collision, fire, and stranding are prima facie marine perils. The ship-
owner, having proved a loss by one of these perils, is brought prima facie within the
policy, and the burden of bringing himself within one of the exceptions to the policy
lies on the marine underwriter. See Attorney General v. Adelaide S. S. Co., L1923]
A. C. 292, 305; Britain S. S. Co. v. The King, [1921] 1 A. C. 99, 119. A difficult prob-
lem arises when a ship leaves port and is never heard of again. Although in time of war,
as in time of peace, there is a presumption of loss by a marine peril, and the burden of
proof is on the marine underwriter to show that loss was due to a war risk excluded by
the warranty, the presumption is not a very strong one, and individual losses have been
decided on the merits of the particular case. The courts have been quick to impose the
loss upon the war insurer in time of war. For cases, see 29 ENGLISn & EMUIR DIGEST
227, Nos. 1841-1846.
3. 3 All E. R. 214 (C. A. 1941).
4. Id. at 220.
[Vol. 51
NOTES
the loss was the tidal set. Since this upheaval of the sea was completely dis-
associated from the war, the loss was placed upon the marine underwriter.
This decision virtually overrules the British holdings of the first World
War. It had been repeatedly said that, to allow recovery on a war risk policy,
the accident must have been "pro-imately caused" by a warlike operation.5
Despite such statements, however, the primuarv consideration of the courts
in practice had been to determine merely whether any of the vessels involved
was engaged in a warlike operation.! The existence of a warlike operation
having been established, it was assumed that the damage occurring in the
course of that operation was proximately caused by it.7 In those cases where
causation was more fully considered, the proximate cause of the injury was
said to be the "impact" of the vessel moving in the course of its operation,"
whether commercial or warlike, or the operation itself,9 of which the impact
constituted an integral part. Absence of lights owing to war, which prevented
vessels from sighting each other in time to avert collision, was said to be
merely one of the conditions uider which the operation was carried out. 0
Negligence on the part of those operating the ships, though not so directly
traceable to any surrounding war conditions, was treated in the same man-
5. See concurring opinion of Lord Sumner in Britain S. S. Cu. v. The King, Green
v. British India Steam Navigation Co., British India Steam Navigation Co. v. Liverpml
& London War Risks Ins. Ass'n, [1921] 1 A. C. 99, 127; see also dissent of Viscoumt
Cave, id. at 107.
6. Compare Commonwealth Shipping Representative v. Peninsular and Oriental
Branch Service, [1923] A. C. 191; Chartnte S. S. Co. v. Director *f Transports, 33 T.
L. R. 434 (C. A. 1922).
7. The result was sometimes stated in the form of a syllogism: "Patrolling for
submarines is a warlike operation. The Tartar was engaged in patrolling. In the courze
of that operation, and while engaged in it, she ran into the Ardgantock. The collisin
is therefore the consequence of the warlike operation." Atturney General v. 1id Coast-
ers; Liverpool and London War Risks Ins. Ass'n v. Marine Underwriters of S. S.
Richard de Larrinaga, [1921] 2 . C. 141, 152; cf. Attorney General v. Adelaide S. S.
Co., [1923] A. C. 292; Commonwealth Shipping Representative v. Peninsular and Orien-
tal Branch Service, [1923] A. C. 191.
8. Attorney General v. Adelaide S. S. Co., [1923] A. C. 292; see Lord Sumner,
concurring, id. at 301. "Whether the navigating officer keeps his course when he should
have given way, or gives way when lie should have kept his course, what proi:mately
causes the damage is the forcible impact of the two vessels." Cf. Attorney General v.
Ard Coasters, [1921] 2 A. C. 141, 147.
9. Attorney General v. Ard Coasters, [1921] 2 A. C. 141. See particularly Lord
Finlay, concurring, id. at 147; Britain S. S. Co. v. The King, [1921] 1 A. C. 99.
10. See Attorney General v. Ard Coasters, [1921] 2 A. C. 141, 153; Britain S. S.
Co. v. The King, [1921] 1 A. C. 99, 115; ef. Le Quellee et Fils v. Thomson, S6 L. J.
K. B. 712 (1916). Contra: British and Foreign S. S. Co. v. The King, [1918] 2 K. B.
879 (C. A.). In Ionides v. Universal 'Marine Insurance Co., 14 C. B. N. S. 259 (1S53),
the argument was advanced that the removal of lights merely reduced the perils of the
sea to normal, and afforded no basis of recovery on a war risk policy. This line of rea-
soning is obviously fallacious in view of the fact that marine insurance rates were based
on the continued presence of such lights as existed in 1860, and not upon pre-historic
conditions.
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ner." Thus, if both vessels, or in the case of stranding, the grounded vessel, 12
was engaged in a technically commercial voyage, the extinguishment of lights
was considered only a condition which increased the risk of loss by a marine
peril, and it remained a marine risk.13 On the other hand, if the ship or
ships were engaged in a warlike operation, the loss caused by the impact
was held to be the consequence of that operation.' 4 On the basis of this
reasoning, discovery of a warlike operation was equivalent to imposition of
the risk upon the war insurer.15
Inasmuch as the definition of "warlike operations" largely controlled the
result of the cases, the major conflict centered around determination of the
reference of that term. It was said that acting as a convoy escort was a
warlike operation,'" but travelling in convoy was not. 1 7 A warship travelling
to a station where it was to undertake a warlike operation was already so
engaged while en route,18 but a cargo vessel sailing to its station to under-
take a warlike operation was not.10 A vessel carrying war supplies between
two war bases was engaged in a warlike operation, 20 but one carrying essen-
11. See Lord Shaw, concurring in Attorney General v. Adehlide S. S. Co., [1923]
A. C. 292, 300: "The conduct may have been faulty, but it was a warlike operation al-
though faultily conducted. Faulty navigation on the part of one ship or the other, is, of
course, the determining factor of responsibility as between the two ships, but, in my
opinion, it is not a legitimate factor for the other purpose which is here attempted-
namely, of converting a war risk into a sea risk." But see Owners of S. S. Larchgrove v.
The King, 36 T. L. R. 108, 109 (K. B. 1919).
12. Apparently stranding and collision cases are to be treated alike. Yorkshire Dale
S. S. Co. v. Minister of War Transport, 2 All E. R. 776, 781 (K. B. 1941), rcv'd on
other grounds, 3 All E. R. 214 (C. A. 1941).
13. Attorney General v. Ard Coasters, [1921] 2 A. C. 141; Britain S. S. Co. v.
The King, [1921] 1 A. C. 99; Atlantic Transport Co. v. Director of Transports, 38 T.
L. R. 160 (K. B. 1921). Contra: British & Foreign S. S. Co. v. The Icng, [19183 2 K.
B. 879 (C. A.).
14. Attorney General v. Adelaide S. S. Co., [1923] A. C. 292; Attorney General v.
Ard Coasters, [1921] 2 A. C. 141; Charente S. S. Co. v. Director of Transports, 38 T. L.
R. 434 (C. A. 1922) ; Atlantic Transport Co. v. Director of Transports, 38 T. L. R. 160
(K. B. 1921).
15. The courts have talked of the possibility of the existence of an "intervening"
cause which would break this chain, but this has apparently been restricted to wilful
acts, or acts of God. See Attorney General v. Adelaide S. S. Co., [1923] A. C. 292, 301;
cf. Moor Line v. King, 36 T. L. R. 799 (K. B. 1920); Henry and MacGregor v. Mar-
ten, 34 T. L. R. 504 (K. B. 1918).
16. Attorney General v. Ard Coasters, [1921] 2 A. C. 141, 151.
17. Britain S. S. Co. v. The King, [1921] 1 A. C. 99; Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe ad
Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 263 U. S. 487 (1924).
18. Attorney General v. Ard Coasters, [1921] 2 A. C. 141.
19. J. Wharton v. Mortleman, 2 All E. R. 261 (C. A. 1941). But if a merchant
ship sights what it believes to be an enemy submarine, and deliberately rams it, the act
is a warlike operation, and any damage caused by the impact falls upon the war insurer.
Henry and MacGregor v. Marten, 34 T. L. R. 504 (K. B. 1918).
20. Commonwealth Shipping Representative v. Peninsular and Oriental Branch
Service, [1923] A. C. 191 (ambulance wagons and other government stores from Mudros
to Alexandria); Atlantic Transport Co. v. Director of Transports, 38 T. L. RI.
160 (K. B. 1921) (to Salonika with horses for the army). It is not quite clear whether
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tial raw materials was not.21 Distinctions were also based upon the per-
centage of war materials in the cargo ;22 and courts even considered as a
determinative factor the question of whether identical supplies, consigned
to the same port, were destined for the military or civil commissariat.p
That these theoretical definitions were not necessarily within the contempla-
tion of the parties in framing the various insurance policies apparently re-
ceived only passing attention.
Relegation of the absence of lights and of travelling in convoy to the status
of conditions under which the operation took place, together with arbitrary
and unrealistic determinations of the reference of "warlike uperations," has
led to distinctions in the allocation of loss which cannot be justified. If a
merchant ship in convoy collides with another vessel in the convoy, the loss
falls either upon the marine or the war underwriter depending upon the
entirely fortuitous circumstances of the cargoes of the ships, their destinations,
or, perhaps, their ports of departure. When a merchant ship operating under
Admiralty instructions runs aground because it is carrying no lights, if it is
carrying a cargo of raw materials, however necessary for the war effort,
the loss falls upon the marine underwriters;24 but if the grounded vessel is
a warship, or is carrying war supplies between war bases, the loss falls upon
the war risk underwriters.m This result is reached though neither the char-
acter of the goods in the hold nor the port of destination affects in any way
the navigation of the vessel or the immediate danger of collision to which it
is exposed.
Despite these incongruities, if the cases afford a basis for prediction upon
which underwriters have relied in setting their rates, it might he thought
that any departure from these rationales would lead to a distortion of the
contract of the parties. But those rules which have been laid down have
so often been criticized in dicta,- followed only after expressions of doubt,:7
the journey must be between two %ar bases, or whether transportation to a vmr base
for war purposes is sufficient. Compare Owners of S. S. Larchgrove Y. The King, 35
T. L. R. 108 (K. B. 1919) (munitions to Marseilles destined for the American army,
held not a warlike operation), with Clan Line Steamers v. Board of Trade, [1929] A.
C. 514 (war supplies to a war base, held a warlike operation).
21. Britain S. S. Co. v. The King, [1921] 1 A. C. 99.
22. Clan Line Steamers v. Board of Trade, [1928] 2 K. B. 557, 571 (C. A.), aff'd,
[1929] A. C. 514; see Commonwealth Shipping Representative v. Peninsular and Oriental
Branch Service, [1923] A. C. 191, 210; Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins.
Co., 263 U. S. 487, 491 (1924).
23. See Clan Line Steamers v. Board of Trade, [1928] 2 K. B. 557, 571 (C. A.),
aff'd, [1929] A. C. 514, 520.
24. See cases cited supra note 20.
25. Attorney General v. Adelaide S. S. Co., [1923] A. C. 292; Commonwealth Ship-
ping Representative v. Peninsular and Oriental Branch Service, [1923] A. C. 191; At-
torney General v. Ard Coasters, [1921] 2 A. C. 141.
26. See opinion of Lord Wrenbury in Britain S. S. Co. v. The King, [1921] 1 A. C.
99, 134; cf. Viscount Finlay in Commonwealth Shipping Representative v. Peninsular
and Oriental Branch Service, [1923] A. C. 191, 205.
27. See Cornmonwealth Shipping Representative v. Peninsular and Oriental Branch
Service, [1923] A. C. 191, 208; Clan Line Steamers v. Board of Trade, [1923] 2 K. B.
557, 568 (C. A.), aff'd, [1929] A. C. 514; Hain S. S. Co. v. Board of Trade, [1923]
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or evaded by artificial distinction,28 that it has become extremely difficult
for the contracting parties to predict, in any given fact situation, what the
courts will decide. 29 It was early held, for instance, that although the navi-
gation of a vessel engaged in a warlike operation had been negligent, a
merchant vessel in a collision with it was damaged as a proximate conse-
quence of the warlike operation.30 The negligence was explained away as
merely a condition of the conduct of the operation, and not the proximate
cause of the loss. On the same theory, when both ships were negligent, the
loss was held to be due to the warlike operation.31 This reasoning would
logically lead to a similar result where only the operators of the merchant
ship are at fault; the "proximate cause" of the damage would be the impact
of a war vessel upon a merchantman, and the negligence of the merchant
ship a mere operational condition. Nevertheless, it has been repeatedly sug-
gested that in any such situation an opposite holding would be reached.0 2
Moreover, in some cases, perplexing distinctions have been made to depend
upon whether the negligence of the vessel engaged in a warlike operation
has consisted of acts of omission or of commission. In the former case the
loss is attributed to the warlike operation, while in the latter the negligence
has been held sometimes to constitute an intervening factor shifting the loss
to the marine underwriter.3 3 To add to the confusion, the courts have upon
occasion rejected the rationale that the impact or operation was the proximate
cause of the loss. 34 Furthermore, in addition to refusing to make a definitive
interpretation of the term "warlike operation," 3 5 courts have often differed
among themselves as to whether a particular activity comes within its
meaning.8 6
2 K. B. 534, 554 (C. A.), aff'd, [1929] A. C. 534; Atlantic Transport Co. v. Director
of Transports, 38 T. L. R. 160 (K. B. 1921).
28. Compare Inui Gomei Kaisha v. Attalico, Lloyd's List, July 20, 1918, Feb. 10,
1919, with Attorney General v. Adelaide S. S. Co., [1923] A. C. 292. Compare Charente
S. S. Co. v. Director of Transports, 38 T. L. R. 434 (C. A. 1922) with Commonwealth
Shipping Representative v. Peninsular and Oriental Branch Service, [1923] A. C. 191.
29. See Harrisons v. Shipping Controller, [1921] 1 K. B. 122, 137; cf. Yorkshire
Dale S. S. Co. v. Minister of War Transport, 2 All E. R. 776, 781 (K. B. 1941), rcv'd,
3 All E. R. 214 (C. A. 1941).
30. Attorney General v. Adelaide S. S. Co., [1923] A. C. 292.
31. Board of Trade v. Hain S. S. Co., [1929] A. C. 534. The court maintained that
inasmuch as the war insurer would have been liable had the sole cause of loss been the
steaming of the war vessel into the merchant ship, he remains liable although the negli-
gence of the merchantman contributed to the accident.
32. See Attorney General v. Adelaide S. S. Co., [1923] A. C. 292, 304-05; Charente
S. S. Co. v. Director of Transports, 38 T. L. R. 434, 435 (K. B. 1922) ; Trinder, Ander-
son and Co. v. Thames and Mersey Marine Ins. Co., [1898] 2 Q. B. 114.
33. Inui Gomei Kaisha v. Attalico, Lloyd's List, July 20, 1918, Feb. 10, 1919. See
Attorney General v. Adelaide S. S. Co., [1923] A. C. 292, 302.
34. Clan Line Steamers v. Board of Trade, [1929] A. C. 514.
35. See Commonwealth Shipping Representative v. Peninsular and Oriental Branch
Service, [1923] A. C. 191, 198-99. For the difficulty in defining the term, see MacCar-
die, J., in Harrisons v. Shipping Controller, [1921] 1 K. B. 122, 130.
36. Compare Owners of S. S. Larchgrove v. The King, 36 T. L. R. 108 (K. B. 1916)
with Clan Line Steamers v. Board of Trade, [1929] A. C. 514. Compare Attorney Gen-
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Confronted by these conflicting authorities and unsatisfactory standards,
the court in the principal case refused to relegate the tidal set to the status
of a condition under which the warlike operation was conducted. On the
contrary, the Court of Appeal adopted the position that the tidal set was
in fact the. "real proximate cause" of the accident and the war service merely
a causa sine qua non.37 The tidal set, it was reasoned, would have carried
the Coxwald on to the Damsel Rocks whatever her cargo or destination,=
and therefore the risk was placed upon the marine insurer.
While the decision represents an advance in freeing the law of the un-
expressed premise that the war risk insurer is liable ipso facto for all acci-
dents to ships in what might, for any technical reason, be denominated war
service, use of the "common sense'; or "real" proximate cause to fix the
locus of risk appears to be of very limited benefit. Such a doctrine might
possibly serve to isolate negligence cases,39 but will hardly determine the
burden of loss where the accident results from the dousing of lights or the
crowding of vessels in convoy because of fear of attack. 0 A solution to
some of the more common problems, it is true, has been provided by the
generally accepted rule that the marine underwriter is liable for losses result-
ing from collisions between, or the stranding of, merchant vessels caused by
convoy conditions or absence of lights.41 The marine insurers have expressly
recognized the imposition of such liability and have specifically provided
against it in their rates.4 ' All possibilities, however, are not and cannot hope
to be so fully covered.
eral v. Ard Coasters, [1921] 2 A. C. 141, 152, vith J. Wharton v. Mortleman, 2 All
E. R. 261 (C. A. 1941). Compare Harrisons v. Shipping Controller, [1921] 1 K. B.
122, with Commonwealth Shipping Representative v. Peninsular and Oriental Branch
Service, [1923] A. C. 191.
37. Yorkshire Dale S. S. Co. v. Minister of War Transport, 3 All a. R. 214, 222
(C. A. 1941).
38. But would the accident have occurred had not the ship been running with dim
lights, subject to convoy conditions, at an established speed and on a set course?
39. In such cases, at least, the doctrine of proximate cause has been developed to
coincide with the reasonable foreseeableness of an act.
40. A nice problem may arise, for e-xample, when a vessel is successively the victim
of an enemy attack and of the fury of the seas. If it was shown that the hostile act so
weakened the vessel that she was unable to withstand the subsequent storm, the .ar
risk insurer alone has been held liable. See Comment (1919) 33 H,,w,. L. RE,. 705,
707, n. 7.
41. Compare Britain S. S. Co. v. The King, [1921] 1 A. C. 99; Harrisons v.
Shipping Controller, [1921] 1 K. B. 122; Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe and Rutgers Fire Ins.
Co., 263 U. S. 487 (1924).
42. Marine insurers in the United States have added a special vartime surcharge
because of increased navigation perils due to the war. Communication tf) the YAu.
LAw JouRNAL from H. W. Farnum, Ass't Sec'y, North American Companies, Oct. 10,
1941. In America, at least, premiums on marine insurance were not raised to compn-
sate for additional risks during the last war. See Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe & Rutget,
Fire Ins. Co., 263 U. S. 487, 492 (1924). Marine Insurance rates in England did go up,
but it is doubtful if this was in reflection of fear of imposition of this risk in view of
increases in risk due to other factors. See FAYLE, TInE WAR AND THE SniPFpno INDUS-
TRY (1927) 287.
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Until the full risks to be borne by each insurer are spelled out and described
in detail in the contracts, it will not be of much use to talk "proximate cause."
The basic issue to be decided by judge or jury-what would the parties to the
contract have intended if they had foreseen the particular eventuality-can
be better settled by direct consideration of that problem than by the use of
a tautological device of such ambiguity as the concept of the proximate cause
of the accident. It is to be hoped that the American courts 43 Will chart their
course during the war without the aid of the shibboleths of "war service,"
or "condition" as contradistinguished from "cause," or even the notion that
in any complex series of events there is any particular cause which can be
singled out as the one upon which alone to predicate liability.
FEDERAL COURT REVIEW OF STATE REGULATION OF
BUSINESS-THE ROWAN & NICHOLS CASES*
FUNDAMENTAL to the maintenance of the Union in our dual system of
government is the check over state regulation of business exercised by the
Supreme Court of the United States.1 In restraining states in this use of
their powers, the Court has 'relied primarily upon the commerce clause2 and
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.8
43. The American courts have dealt with few cases on the point, and are thus hap-
pily free of the arbitrary precedents of the older British cases. The leading United States
case, Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 263 U. S. 487 (1924), followed
the contemporary English rulings, partly in order to achieve conformity with them. Now
that the English courts have reversed their position in the principal case, the Queen In.
surance Company case may be overruled in this country.
* Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573 (1940),
amended, 311 U. S. 614 (1940); id., 311 U. S. 570 (1941). See Comment, Proration of
Petroleum Production (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 608.
1. "I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power
to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could
not make that declaration as to the laws of the several states." Hoii.tvs, COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS (1920) 295-96.
2. U. S. CoNsT. Art. 1, § 8(3). The commerce clause was first utilized to restrict
state action in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824).
3. U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1. The concept seems to have originated in Mug-
ler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887), even though the state statute there involved was
sustained. See Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court
(1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 943, 946-47. Some commentators trace the idea to Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (1890). See Hough, Due
Process of Law-Today (1919) 32 H~av. L. REv. 218, 228. For an historical treat-
ment of due process, see Mor, DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1926). See also HAINES, Tur
RVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930) 143 et seq. For a discussion of the two
clauses and other possible checks on the states, see Moses, The Constitutional, Legis-
lative, and Judicial Growth of Oil and Gas Conservation Statutes (1941) 13 Miss. L. J.
353, 363.
NOTES
While both clauses have been used to limit the legislative and administrative
provinces of the states in the regulation of business, the boundaries thus
established have varied according to which provision was applied, and which
justices were speaking for the Court. In an inquiry based on the commerce
clause, the Supreme Court has formulated the issue in terms of the effect
of the state regulation upon the national interest in controlling commerce.4
Where the due process doctrine has been applied by the Court, emphasis
has centered about protecting individual rights of liberty and property from
state interference.5 While these doctrines are not in all cases available as
alternative bases for decision and while they do show conspicuous differences
of focus, they have been closely linked in the interplay of constitutional dogma.
Opposition to the application of the due process clause or the commerce
clause in invalidating state legislation has been expressed on several grounds.
Some jurists and legal commentators have opposed widespread use of due
process on the ground that its precepts have been extended so far that the
states have been denied sufficient leeway for experiment. Some urged that
due process should embody only procedural safeguards and should not permit
review of state declarations of business policy.7 And others, solicitous of states
rights, have been reluctant to strike down state legislation because it inter-
feres with national commerce - an interference which has grown more likely
as a result of cases which vastly broadened the federal commerce power.8
\Vhile it is not yet clear how the present Supreme Court of the United States
will utilize these two constitutional clauses to restrain state action, and though
the future status of the due process doctrine is especially dubious, there are
some foreshadowings of the line that the Court will ultimately take.9
Apparently the due process clause will be zealously employed to control
procedure in criminal cases, and to protect basic civil liberties of individuals
and, perhaps, corporations as well.10 And as regards the chief fighting
4. See South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Broq., 303 U. S. 177, 1,5-
86 (1938); Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, 523 (1935).
5. See Brown, supra note 3, at 966; CoRvriu, THE TWILIrnT or TnE Sump, mn
COURT (1934) 52 et seq.
6. Outstanding exponents were Justices Holmes and Brandeis. See Frankfurter,
Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution (1931) 45 HArnv. L. RE%. 33, 44; Frankfurter,
Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution (1927) 41 H, v. L. Rcv. 121, 144-45. But
their individual applications of the view did not always coincide. See Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922).
7. fr. justice Holmes approached this idea at times. See his dissents in Tyson
& Brother v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 445 (1927), and Lochner v. New York, 193 U. S.
45, 74 (1905). For typical discussion see Maurer, Due Process and the Supreme Court
(1934) 22 GEo. L. 3. 710.
S. See Humes, Trend of Decisions Respecting the Power of Congress to Regulate
Interstate Commerce (1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 846.
9. See JAcKsoN, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICUL SUPREZMAC.Y (1941) 43-57; Fr m:-
PunTER AxD LANDIS, THE BusiNEss OF THE SUPREITE COURT (1928) 300.
10. Criminal procedure: e.g., Lisenba v. California, 62 Sup. Ct. 280 (U. S. 1941);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940). Civil liberties: see, e.g., Bridges v. Cali-
fornia; Times-firror Co. v. Superior Court of California, 62 Sup. Ct. 190 (U. S. 1941).
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issue of the Supreme Court of preceding years, the due process clause as
a ground for invalidating state regulation of business, some inferences may
be drawn from the two recent cases of Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Rowan & Nichols Oil Company." In both these cases, the Commission
appealed from lower federal court decrees enjoining its oil proration orders.'"
The lower courts had held that the regulations confiscated the company's
property and deprived it of leasehold rights to oil in place without due
process of law. The invalidation of both proration orders was, however,
reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States. Since the record was
actually reviewed and the action of the Railroad Commission found to be
reasonable and fair,13 it could be argued that no real change in the due
process technique has been effected by the Rowan & Nichols cases. Yet the
language used by the Court in its opinion and the disposition made in this
and other cases on remittitur 14 suggest that a substantial mutation in the
due process approach has appeared-a change extending far beyond the
Rowan & Nichols cases themselves.
The immediate effect of the decisions is to broaden the, scope of the state
police power in the regulation of oil production. After weighing the desira-
bility of state legislation against the nature and extent of private rights
affected by it,' 5 federal courts have previously annulled statutes in a variety
of fields., In former proration cases, for example, certain property rights
of oil and gas lessees have been accorded judicial protection.1" The Supreme
Court of the United States has asserted the invalidity of proration orders
But cf. Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160 (1941). See Hamilton and Braden, The
Special Competence of the Suprene Court (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1319, 1349 et seq.
11. Railroad Commission 'of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S. 573
(1940), amended, 311 U. S. 614 (1940); id., 311 U. S. 570 (1941) (hereafter cited by
volume and page).
12. The first order, formulated in 1938, was enjoined by the District Court for the
Western District of Texas. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas,
28 F. Supp. 131 (W. D. Tex. 1939). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 107 F. (2d)
70 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939). Because of that injunction, the Commission had to formulate
a new order, which was in turn enjoined by a three-judge district court prior to the first
Supreme Court opinion. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas,
35 F. Supp. 573 (W. D. Tex. 1940).
13. "A flat per well allowance to these producers was not an unnatural answer to
the problem." 310 U. S. 573, 583.
14. See Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U. S. 376 (1939).
15. See note 5 supra. Each case is said to be decided on its own facts [see Village
of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 387 (1926); Noble State Bank
v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 112 (1911)] and great weight is presumably attached to leg-
islative judgment [see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 668 (1925); Williams v.
Arkansas, 217 U. S. 79, 88 (1910)].
16. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105 (1928); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U. S. 390 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1 (1915).
17. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U. S. 55 (1937); People's
Petroleum Producers, Inc. v. Sterling, 60 F. (2d) 1041 (E. D. Tex. 1932); People's
Petroleum Producers, Inc. v. Smith, 1 F. Supp. 361 (E. D. Tex. 1932). See Sterling
v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 396 (1932).
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which bore no reasonable relation to preventitn of waste or irt'tcction of
the supposed correlative rights of owners in the coninion reservoir, or orderb
which were found to be arbitrary or unreasonable in any other respect.'3
Under various guises this general doctrine has been followed in the federal
courts. 19 The reasoning has been that, in spite Of the virtually univert-al
common law "rule of capture" which permits ownership of only so much
of the mineral as is reduced to possession, oil and gas lessees have a rather
vaguely defined claim to the mineral in place under their leases even before
reduction to possession. Yet in the Rozean &' Nichols cases the state police
power was allowed to override this previously-erected claim by a p.,tulation
that the Railroad Commission was acting for the welfare of the jeople as
a, whole and should be granted the pkiwer to subordinate private interests
to that larger purpose.:' The Court mentioned the "rule of capture" as a
case law doctrine giving rise to the orders2 1 and noted that, in the view of
the Conunission's experts, complainants actually benefited from the challenged
regulations.2 2 But the lack of emphasis placed on these arguments indicates
judicial willingness to permit the broadest possible operation of the police
power of the state- an attitude certainly consistent with other recent ca-ses.1 3
The Rowan & Nichols cases go further: the bold conception of due proce.s,
they advance is applied directly to the freedom of administrative bodies to
formulate policy. In dealing with confiscation claims such as those involved
here, reviewing courts, under the constitutional facts doctrine, have not leen
bound to accept the administrative fact findings as conclusive.2  While the
Supreme Court of the United States said that it would attach great weight
to administrative findings in cases of that type,2  a trial de nuvo seemed
the only certain way to satisfy the constitutional facts d, 'ctrine.'-  Despite
the Court's designation of this technique for review of constitutional facts,
lower federal courts have treated them in a variety of ways. Some have
18. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Ctirp., 301 U. S. 55 (1937).
19. Canadian River Gas Co. v. Terrell, 4 F. Supj.. 222 (V. D. Tex. 1933); Peul~e'
Petroleum Producers, Inc. v. Sterling, 60 F. (2d) 1041 (E. D. Te. 1932); Peoulpi
Petroleum Producers, Inc. v. Smith, 1 F. Supp. 3sl. (E. D. Tie.. 1932). See Summers,
Does the Regulation of Oil Production Require the Denial of Due Process and the qwIul
Protection of the Law's? (1940) 19 TE.x. L. REX. 1, 19-201.
20. See 310 U. S. 573, 579; 311 U. S. 570, 577.
21. See 310 U. S. 573, 579.
22. See 310 U. S. 573, 581.
23. See South Carolina State Highwa y Dep't v. Barjell Bros., 303 U. S. 177,
190-91 (1938). For discussion of this tendency in relation tv proratiun, see Mors, The
Constitutional, Legislatize, and Judicial Growth of Oil and Gas Conserz ation Statutes
(1941) 13 Miss. L. J. 353.
24. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 (193ti); Ohio Val-
ley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 7 (1920). A related ductrine is that
of jurisdictional facts. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932). But cf. South Chi-
cago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 231 (1940).
25. See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 53 (193fi).
26. See FImkL. REPORT (F THE AT'OR Y GEXERAL'S Cuxi eTin o:. Aums:o TnaTI.
PRocmuRE (1941) 87.
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simply studied the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports
the statute.27 Other tribunals, after stating that orders grounded upon sub-
stantial evidence should be upheld, have proceeded to decide many of the
fact questions involved.28 And the complete trial de novo rule set forth
by the Supreme Court has, of course, also been followed. 29
Yet in the Rowan & Nichols cases the Court signified its reluctance to
undertake any review of the judgment of the state administrative body in
choosing the enforcement policy actually before the courts. This unwilling-
ness may be explained by reference to the factors which generally account
for dissimilar types of judicial review of administrative action.30 Complex
fact situations may delimit that review; the Rowan & Nichols cases involve
the technical, scientific field of proration which is not readily comprehended
by nonexperts.3 1 Moreover, the Texas Railroad Commission especially has
been hampered by persistent judicial invalidation of its orders.32 And the
Court evinced, by frequent references to the expertness of the Commission,
a faith in the responsibility of that particular agency.33 Although the Supreme
Court did not expressly discard the constitutional facts doctrine, it did dis-
regard it in the Rowan & Nichols cases.34 When thes cases are coupled
with the steady criticism levelled at the doctrine of constitutional facts,"
they would seem to indicate judicial dissatisfaction with it and probably
27. Clymore Production Co. v. Thompson, 11 F. Supp. 791 (XV. D. Tex. 1935)
Danciger Oil & Refining Co. of Texas v. Smith, 4 F. Supp. 236 (N. D. Tex, 1933).
To add to the confusion, the Supreme Court itself has apparently followed this doctrine.
See Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176 (1935).
28. Amazon Petroleum Corp. v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 5 F. Supp. 633
(E. D. Tex. 1934); MacMillan v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 51 F. (2d) 400 (W.
D. Tex. 1931).
29. National Fertilizer Ass'n v. Bradley, 18 F. Supp. 263 (W. D. S. C. 1936), aft'd,
301 U. S. 178 (1937); Canadian River Gas Co. v. Terrell, 4 F. Supp. 222 (W. D. Tex.
1933).
30. See FINAL REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CoMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE (1941) 75-76, 91; Landis, Administrative Policies and the Courts (1938) 47
YALE L. J. 519, 534-35.
31. "The accommodation of conflicting private interests in the East Texas oil field,
with due regard to the public welfare, is beset with perplexities, both geological and
economic." 311 U. S. 570, 574.
32. See 310 U. S. 573, 580; Davis, Judicial Emasculation of Administrative Action
and Oil Proration: Another View (1940) 19 TEx. L. REv. 29, 39-44.
33. ". . . it is clear that the Due Process Clause does not require the feel of the
expert to be supplanted by an independent view of judges on the conflicting testimony
and prophesies and impressions of expert witnesses." 311 U. S. 570, 576. For criticism
of this reliance of the Court on the agency's expertness, see Summers, The Rowan &
Nichols Cases (1941) 13 Miss. L. J. 417, 422-23.
34. In both cases the lower courts tried facts and law de novo. See 310 U. S. 573,
584 (Roberts, J., dissenting); 311 U. S. 570, 576. But cf. Summers, supra note 19, at
9-10, 24-26.
35. See the opinions of Brandeis, J., concurring in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v.
United States, 298 U. S. 38, 73 (1936), and dissenting in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22,
65 (1932).
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augur specific rejection in the near future.30 Since the Court did no more
than review the administrative record, thus following the ordinary procedure
for examining administrative decisions,37 the substantial evidence rule com-
monly used in such situations may be expected to supplant the constitutional
facts precept.38
It may well be that the Court's expressed disapproval of the lower courts'
inquiries into reasonableness - the very core of any due process case-
in the Rowan & Nichols cases30 also foreshadows absolute renunciation of
the due process clause in relation to state regulation of business. Although
the Court might be said to have reviewed the record in order to determine
the rationality of the challenged regulations, its examination was cur.ory
at best.40 Other parts of the opinions, particularly the amendment to the
earlier one,4 ' reinforce the view that the majority intends to remove the
question of the arbitrary character of substantive state action from the juris-
diction given to the federal courts hy the Fourteenth Anendment.42 Further
support for this position is derived from the emphasis placed upon the fact
that all the procedural requirements were satisfied.43 The view that the
Supreme Court is limiting due process to procedure and the protection of
civil liberties 44 confirms the indication in the Rowan & Nichols cases that
the clause has been abandoned as a check on state regulation of business.
The rejection of due process in the area of the jurisdiction of states to tax'"
and the reiteration of the maxim that the polls, not the courts, are the proper
media for the preservation of substantive interests4 6 further evince such a
trend.
But the abdication of the position that the Fourteenth Amendment furnishes
a basis for reviewing substantive state action does not mean that the balance
is to be tipped entirely in the states' favor. The Holmesian fear of abandon-
ment of federal control stemmed from apprehension of the resultant effects
on national commerce rather than upon concern for protecting individual
36. The jurisdictional facts tenet, although not applicable to the Raocan & Nichols
cases, is so related to the constitutional facts theorem that, seemingly, they must stand or
fall together.
37. See FIN.%L REPORT OF THE ATTORqEY GEI"EFUL'S CI oM1r_.r o ADUMISATRL
PROcED -RE (1941) 87.
38. See id. at 88-90; Summers, supra note 19, at 8-9. For an evaluation of this Jro-
cedure see Hardwicke, Oil Conscrvzation: Statutes, Administration, and Court Revicw
(1941) 13 Mliss. L. J. 381, 409-14.
39. See 310 U. S. 573, 581-82; 311 U. S. 570, 575-76.
40. See Summers, supra note 33, at 419-20.
41. See Sun Oil Co. v. Burford, 124 F. (2d) 467 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941).
42. See comment on the Court's abdication of its duties in dissenting opiniun of
Roberts, J., 310 U. S. 573, 584.
43. See 310 U. S. 573, 584; 311 U. S. 570, 572.
44. See DODD, CASES ox CONSTITuTION x. L,%w, Cum. Surp. (1940) 179; Hamilton
and Braden, loc. cit. supra note 10.
45. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435 (1940), (1941) 50 Y,%.u L. J. 900.
46. Sed Black, J., dissenting in McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U. S. 419,
428 (1938). The best-known expression of the doctrine is embodied in Munn v. Illinuis,
94 U. S. 113, 134 (1877).
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rights.47 But the commerce clause remains as a potentially significant judicial
check on state action in the former sphere. And that clause must now play
an even more important role than it has in the past if the proper balance
between states and nation is to be achieved.48
A substantial opposition to such a use of the commerce clause has already
crystallized in the Supreme Court of the United States.49 If it is to win
acceptance, the commerce clause must prove its ability to effect practical
adjustment between state and national interests50 Such factors as the desir-
ability of uniform regulation, the local concern, the competitive disadvantage
to interstate commerce, and the possibility that the national economy will be
Balkanized by state tariffs and other trade barriers must all be weighed in
determining the validity of each state enactnent.rt In the Rowan & Nichols
cases, for example, it would be vital to begin analysis with the fact that the
Texas system of proration is part of a national scheme of production control,
designed to limit production to "reasonable consumptive demand," and
operated through state proration laws, interstate compacts and estimates of
consumption made by the Federal Bureau of Mines.52 Thus interstate pro-
ducers may be burdened by multiple regulation, 3 and out-of-state consumers
may be affected by state price-fixing schemes without being able to complain
about them. 4 Against these considerations would stand the state's alleged
interest in conserving its natural resources and the supposed impracticability
47. "For one in my place sees how often a local policy prevails with those who are
not trained to national views and how often action is taken that embodies what the
Commerce Clause was meant to end." HOLMES, 1oC. cit. supra note 1.
48. See address by Mr. Justice Stone, Fifty Years' IWork of the United States Su-
prenic Court (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 428, 430. For development of the commerce clause,
see CORWIN, THE COM M2ERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS (1936).
49. See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power (1940) 27 VA. L. Rt..v.
1, 15-16.
50. ". . . commerce among the states is not a technical legal conception, but a
practical one, drawn from the course of business." Holmes, J., in Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U. S. 375, 398 (1905).
51. See Dowling, supra note 49, at 21-24.
52. See Comment, Proration of Petroleunt Production (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 608
passim. Restriction of production to reasonable consumptive demand has been held to be
a natural and proper method of preventing physical waste. Chanplin Refining Co, v.
Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210 (1932); Danciger Oil & Refini-
ing Co. v. Smith, 4 F. Supp. 236 (N. D. Tex. 1933). Contra: MacMillan v. Railroad
Commission of Tex., 51 F. (2d) 400 (W. D. Tex. 1931). Cf. West'v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229 (1911). See also Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895 (S. D. Cal.
1941), 21 B. U. L. REV. 716.
53. Compare McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U. S. 33, 45, n. 2 (1940) ; South
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 184, n. 2 (1938).
54. ". . . to the extent that the burden falls on economic interests without the
state, it is not likely to be alleviated by those political restraints which are normally
exerted on legislation where it affects adversely inteiests within the state." McGoldrick
v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U. S. 33, 46, n. 2 (1940). See also South Carolina State
Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 185, n. 2 (1938). Put cf. Chamnplin
Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission of Oklahoma, 286 U. S. 210 (1932).
686 [Vol. 51
NOTES
of Congressional control of oil production.- ', Instead of weighing the desir-
ability of state regulation against the deprivation of private rights, as has
been customary under the due process clause, the court would balance local
and general interests so as to perpetuate a federated system of government
capable of dealing effectively with the prols'-nis of an expanding national
economyY06
SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES*
IN criminal prosecutions by the Federal Government, as for antitrut
activities,' unfair trade practices,2 and security frauds.3 defendants 4 are gen-
erally served with subpoenas duces tecum ordering them to produce their
books and papers material to issues in litigation, The subpoenas are drawl
55. Compare United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 101) (1441), amended, 312 U. S. 457
(1941). But see Comment, Proration of Petroleum Prod uctin (1942) 51 Y xu L. J.
608 passim.
56. "The excessive use for insufficient reasn of a judicially inflated due proce!
clause to strike down states' laws regulating their own internal affairs, such as hur;
of labor in industry, minimum wage requirem ntq, and standards for working condi-
tions, is one thing. To invoke the interstate commerce clause to keep the many states
from fastening their several concepts of local 'well heing' onto the national commerce is
a wholly different thing." Jackson. J., concurring in Duckworth v. Arhkana- 62 Sup.
Ct. 311, 316 (U. S. 1941).
* Record, vol. 2, pp. 117-27, United States v. American Tobacco Co.. U. S. Dist.
Ct., E. D. Ky., Crim. No. 6670, filed July 24. 1940.
1. See Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 ST.%T. 20'9) (110), amended, 511 STAT. 693 (1Q37),
15 U. S. C. §§1, 2, 3 (1940).
Recently the United States Department of Justice has adopted the theory that crim-
inal prosecutions for antitrust activities are more effective in achieving compliance w ith
the federal laws than civil suits for injunctions. See lcrge, Renicdies Av'ailable to the
Government Under the Sherman Act (19410 7 L.%w & Ct.xTEMP. PP ,n. 104.
2. See Robinson-Patman Act, 49 ST.T. 1526. 152, (193t,). 15 U. S. C. § 13a ( 1940).
3. See Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74. 87 (1033). 15 U. S. C. § 77x (1940).
4. If defendants are individuals, they can stand on the privilege against svlf-incrini-
ination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and refu,e to prwluce
their own books. This privilege as well as the fact that m-,ut individuals have only a
few documents to evidence their activities nccesarily limits the problem of sulpumaesd
documents in criminal cases to corporate bouks. Neither a corporation nor any of its
officers has a constitutional privilege to refuse to produce curpurate bhwks on the ground
of self-incrimination. Essgee Co. v. United States, 2o2 U. S. 151 t1923) ; \Vil,,n V.
United States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911) ; Hale v. Henkel. 201 U. S. 43 .lV04).
5. The use of subpoenas has been sanctioned by the statutes interdicting antitrust
activities [26 STAT. 210 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 5 (YP40) ] ; unfair trade practices [33 Sr -r.
722 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §49 (1940)]; and security frauds [48 STaT. 87 (1933), 15 U.
S. C. § 77uuu (1940)]. For discussion of the essential role of subpoenas duces tecum iu
antitrust prosecutions, see Rice, Trial Technique in .Antitrust Cases (1940) 7 LAw &
CONTEMP. PaoB. 138, 141.
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in the broadest possible terms;0 in compliance, defendants usually appear at
the courtroom trailed by several trucking vans laden with filing cabinets.,
The court is then confronted by the vexing problem of how it should deal
with this potential documentary evidence.
In ordinary situations where only a few documents are subpoenaed, well-
established practice requires that the demandant wait to see them until he
reaches the point in his case where they become relevant as evidence.8 He
can then call upon the possessor to produce the documents; if the producing
party has an objection based on relevancy or privilege, the documents may
be submitted to the court for inspection. If the court then overrules the
objection, the demandant may examine the documents and determine whether
to introduce them into evidence. 9 This procedure occasions no great incon-
venience or delay when a small number of documents is involved. But where
the number of documents runs into thousands as it must necessarily do in
many federal criminal cases, this same procedure would act effectively to
clog the machinery of justice while court and jury wait for counsel to conduct
detailed investigations into ponderous records.
The expedient procedure where there are many documents is to permit
unqualified inspection ° by the demandant as soon as they are produced
so that he can sort out the relevant ones and have them ready when neces-
sary." In the past some parties producing documents have acquiesced in
inspection. 12 But often other litigants have taken a combative attitude and
employed every device available to conceal information possibly useful to
6. See 8 WIGMORE, EvIncC (3d ed. 1940) § 2200.
7. Some two hundred and fifty files were produced in trucks by the American To-
bacco Company in a recent prosecution under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Record, vol. 1,
p. 37, United States v. American Tobacco Co., U. S. Dist. Ct., E. D. Ky., Crim. No.
6670, filed July 24, 1940. In the Sugar Instilute case about 500,000 documents were sub-
poenaed. Record, Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553 (1936). In the Alum-
inum Company case, the Government roughly selected 16,000 documents from a group
produced under compulsion by defendants. Record, United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. N. Y., Eq. No. 85-73, filed April 23, 1937.
8. Edison Electric Light Co. v. United States Electric Lighting Co., 45 Fed. 55
(C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1891). See 8 WIIMiORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2200.
9. For simplified analysis, see GOLDSTEiN, TRIAL TECHNIQUE (1935) c. 7.
10. The phrase "unqualified inspection" imports not only that the demandant should
be allowed to inspect the documents before they are needed in evidence but also that
the court should attach no condition to the inspection by way of a prior judicial deter-
mination of the relevancy of the documents.
11. Preferably the production and inspection should take place before the jury has
been sworn in and the trial has begun. See Rice, supra note 5, at 144. This will not
ordinarily be possible for a subpoena is customarily returnable on the first day of trial.
But the court may require its return before trial. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.
S. 421, 443 (1932). Or one party may request a postponement of the trial on the first day,
before the jury is selected, as was done in the American Tobacco case. Even if a pretrial
inspection is impossible, the presentation of the case to the jury will be expedited by per-
mitting an inspection during the course of the trial before the documents are required
in evidence. See Rice, supra note 5, at 141.
12. For example, in the American Tobacco case only one company refused to allow
inspection. Six other defendants raised no objection.
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the opposition and to delay the presentation of its case.13 Criminal cases
provide a fertile field for this sort of tactical battle over unqualified inspection
of subpoenaed documents because the pertinent case law is meager and
confused and no attempt to formulate a uniform rule has yet been made.14
In the recent criminal prosecution of the American Tobacco Company by
the United States of America acting under the Sherman Antitrust Act'
defendants were effectively prevented from obstructing unqualified examina-
tion of their documents by the Government. In response to a subpoena
duces tecum and prior to the opening of the trial defendants had produced
a number of truckloads of documents. The Government made a general
motion for a pretrial inspection, defendants objected, but the court granted
the motion unconditionally. The decision in the American Tobacco case is
significant both for its exercise of a non-statutory power of the court to
,rant a pretrial inspection of documents and for its failure to require an
examination into the relevance of those documents prior to an inspection.
To be contrasted with this solution of the problem of examination of
subpoenaed documents is the restrictive ruling in one phase of the case of
the Unzited States v. Aluminum Company of Atmcrica.16 Although the suit
was a civil action conducted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,17
the decision indicates a judicial frame of mind which is overzealous to
prevent invasion of individual or corporate rights of privacy' 8 and can be
expected to block any attempted liberalization of criminal procedure. Some
eighty-seven documents were produced by the defendant at the trial in
answer to a subpoena duces tecum whereupon the plaintiff motioned for an
inspection of the documents under Rule 34.10 It was held that the plaintiff
had a right to inspect the documents but that the court must first determine
whether or not they were relevant. judge Caffey accordingly read through
all the documents and decided that twenty-nine of them were relevant. These
were then submitted to the defendant to re-examine and to assert further
objections. Only after each objection had been overruled was the Govern-
ment permitted to inspect the documents.
13. By bringing documents into court and refusing to allov an inspection, the pos-
sessor can cause the demandant great embarrassment since it becomes extrenely al:-
ward for him to attempt to prove the relevancy of the documents without a prior inspec-
tion. See Rice, supra note 5, at 143.
14. The Supreme Court of the United States has recently been authorized by Con-
gress to promulgate uniform rules for criminal proceedings in federal district courts.
54 STAT. 688, 18 U. S. C. § 687 (1940).
15. Record, vol. 2, pp. 117-27, United States v. American Tobacco Co., U. S. Dist.
Ct., E. D. Ky., Crim. No. 6670, filed July 24, 1940.
16. 26 F. Supp. 711 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
17. 28 U. S. C. following § 723c (1940).
18. This attitude hearkens back to the common law privilege of a party-opponent not
to bear testimony. See 8 WIGmoaE, EviDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 219.
19. Rule 34 provides: "Upon motion of any party . . . the court in which an ordetr
is pending may order any party to produce and permit the inspection . . . of any desig-
nated documents, papers, books . . . which constitute or contain evidence material to
any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody, or con-
trol . . . "
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This procedure represents the extreme in protection to litigants whose
documents are subjected to inspection as provided by Rule 34. But insofar
as achieving speedy trials in cases involving a multitude of documents, it
is just as time-consuming and cumbersome as the process of judicial inspec-
tion of documents before they are offered in evidence. Moreover, the ruling
of the Ahminum Company case has the added disadvantage that the judge
does not have the benefit of the evidence previously given at the trial" to
aid him in determining the materiality of the documents.
From a policy point of view the decision of Judge Ford in the American
Tobacco case is the best solution to the problem of subpoenaed documents
in federal criminal cases. Inspection of documents, pretrial or otherwise,
subjects the producing party to no new disability. The demandant might
have secured free access to them with a full examination by means of a
grand jury investigation. 21 It is inexcusable to penalize the short-circuiting
of this expensive and time-consuming mechanism. Furthermore, the demand-
ant has a right to know whether or not there has been substantial compliance
with the subpoena duces tecum. Until all the documents called for have been
produced, he is under no compulsion to proceed with his case.22 And only
by a personal inspection can the demandant determine that the documents
he requested will be available for future use.
Aside from the American Tobacco ruling, case law in support or in contra-
vention of the power of the court to grant an inspection prior to or during
the trial is non-existent. There are some supporting dicta.23 Despite the lack
of precedent, however, use of the power is adequately sanctioned by statutes
and long established judicial custom, both of which authorize the court to
issue all writs necessary to expedite the trial with justice to the parties. 24
20. See Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U. S. 533, 541 (1911) ; Jasigi v. Brown, 1 Curt.
401, 402 (C. C. D. Mass. 1853).
21. Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273 (1919). See also Lewin, The Conduct
of Grand Jury Proceedings in Antitrust Cascs (1940) 7 LAW & CONTEn. PiRo. 112, 130.
22. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCF (3d ed. 1940) § 2199.
23. See Capital v. Fox, 85 F. (2d) 97, 100 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) ("It must be remem-
bered, however, that the subpoenas merely require the physical production of documents
in court; the extent of their inspection will be for the judge, like the scope of oral ex-
amination."); Banks v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 79 Coni. 116, 119, 64 At. 14,
15 (1906) ("The future of documents after they have, pursuant to an order of produc-
tion, passed into the control of the court is for its determination, and is a matter quite
independent of the act of production which has been completed."). Rule 34 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure was required to abrogate the common law rule that the
court is powerless to compel the production of documents for inspection, 8 W\iamom,
EviDENcE (3d ed. 1940) §2219. But this development contains no authority against a
right to an inspection per se since it was concerned with the production of docunients
for inspection and not the inspection of documents already impounded in court.
24. Section 262 of the Judicial Code provides: ". . . The Supreme Court, the cir-
cuit courts of appeals, and the district courts shall have power to issue all writs not spe-
cifically provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respec-
tive jurisdictions, and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 36 STAT. 1162
(1911), 28 U. S. C. § 377 (1940). A United States Circuit Court of Appeals recently
declared that this provision authorized the grant of the privilege of a pretrial inspection.
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Once the power to grant an inspection of documents is established, there
is no need for a court to determine their relevancy as a condition precedent
to an exercise of the power. The decision in the Amerian Tobacco case
permitting an unconditional inspection exhibits a sound use of judicial dis-
cretion. Other courts have wasted valuable time because they confused
three situations in which the question of relevancy may arise. The first is
where documents are produced in answer to a subpoena duces tecum. In
such a case the possessor may properly refuse to comply with the subpoena
unless the court agrees that the documents sought might become relevant
in the trial.2 The second situation occurs when the demandant seeks to
introduce into evidence documents already in court and the court must then
determine which documents are relevant.20 In both these situations the
question of relevancy is properly placed in issue and its resolution serves
a useful function. In the first case a determination of irrelevancy may fore-
stall a useless production of docmnents; in the second it may avoid preju-
dicing the jury.
But in the third and intermediate situation where the documents are in
court but are not required in evidence at the time demandant moves for
inspection,2 7 the court should not consider the question of relevancy. M
unconditional right of inspection is an eminently sensible solution to the
procedural problem presented by the production of massive business files
in court in compliance with a subpoena duces tecum. The party claiming
inspection best knows what documents are important to his case and, if he
gains access to the material before it is required as evidence, he may organize
his presentation of the facts to promote rapid conduct of the trial. The
time of the court and the jury is thus conserved if an unqualified right of
inspection is allowed to the demandant where records are in court before
they are introduced in evidence. Nor is the producing party deprived of
any substantial rights by this procedure. The producing party has no right
See Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. NLR B, 120 F. (2d) 126, 127 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941).
See also Banks v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 79 Ginn. 116, 121, 64 Ati. 14, 15
(1906).
25. The Supreme Court has aptly described relevancy in term,; of "probable ma-
teriality." See Brown v. United States, 276 U. S. 134, 143 (1928). In another case a
"prima facie" showing of competency was required. Se General Finance curp. v. New
York State Ry., 1 F. Supp. 381, 382 (WV. D. N. Y. 1931). A third court has assorted
the subpoenaed documents on the basis of "such as might be offered in evidence." See Mil-
ler v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 139 Fed. 44 (S. D. N. Y. 1905). For some
refinements in the meaning of relevancy as applied in civil actions, see (1940) 50 Y,Lr
L. J. 708. See generally 8 Wi;NRoi, Evn'ENCE (3d ed. 1940) §2200.
26. The determination is the same as that % hich must lie made w hen an objection
is raised to the introduction in evidence of any exhibit ur tetimuny. See 8 Wl .naq,
EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2193. The competency of the documents may be established
to the satisfaction of the party in possession by argument on the production under the
subpoena duces tecum. But for a case in which an objection was raised at both stages,
see Edison Electric Light Co. v. United States Electric Lighting Co., 44 Fed. 294 1 C. C.
S. D. N. Y. 1890); 45 Fed. 55 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1891).
27. See note 19 supra.
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to absolute privacy ;28 his only right is to be protected against unreasonable
searches and seizures.20 If he does not object to the materiality of the docu-
ments at the time when their production is sought, he should be foreclosed
from objecting until the documents are offered in evidence. And if the
defendant is forced to submit documents to his opponent for inspection, in
the interim between their production and their introduction in evidence,
he loses nothing more than substantial justice requires if they are found
to contain evidence. If the documents do not furnish relevant evidence, it
may always be said that defendant had an opportunity to weed out the
irrelevant material before returning the subpoena duces tecum.
In future criminal cases under the present confused status of the law some
federal courts may be expected to permit inspection of subpoenaed documents
without restriction; others may exercise personal supervision; and still others
may find that no right of inspection exists. With increased governmental
supervision of large scale business the problem will become more acute.
The status of subpoenaed documents in federal criminal cases should now be
resolved by the Supreme Court Rules Committee."0 This Committee should
adopt the ruling made by Judge Ford in the American Tobacco case that
a motion for an inspection is to be granted without regard to the materiality
of the evidence. A provision should also be made for production upon
notice, leaving the demandant free, however, to choose between this method
and the use of a subpoena duces tecum. 3' In order to assist the court
in determining the materiality of documents when the question is properly
raised under a subpoena duces tecum or a motion to produce, the judge
should be allowed to refer the case to a master who would hear both parties
and then decide what documents should be produced.32
Action on the part of the Rules Committee is also required to clarify
Rule 34. Under the decision in the American Tobacco case, a procedure
impossible under Judge Caffey's interpretation of Rule 34 can be secured
by calling upon the general power of the court to expedite the trial. If that
procedure be generally adopted,a3 Rule 34 would be effectively circumvented.
28. Capital v. Fox, 85 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
29. U. S. CoNsT. AISEND. IV; Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886) ; Hale
v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906).
30. Congress has indicated its willingness to give legislative sanction to any uni-
form rule which the Court might adopt. See note 14 supra.
31. Rules 34 and 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would provide a model
for drafting the desired provision.
32. If a procedure is prescribed for the inspection of documents which have been
brought into court, probably more objections will be forthcoming at the time when pro-
duction is first sought. A method to conserve the time of the judge against the burden-
some examination of these documents is therefore imperative. Some of the states have
adopted the practice of delegating the function to a court commissioner. See RAGLAND,
DiscoERy BEFORE TRIAL (1932) 104.
33. The fact that the American Tobacco case involved a criminal prosecution would
seem to permit the ready extension of the benefit of Judge Ford's ruling to civil suits in
which the courts have not been required by the Constitution to act so zealously to pro-
tect corporate or individual rights of privacy.
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The Committee should accordingly amend Rule 34 to make it conform to
the procedure followed by judge Ford so that a motion to inspect documents
already before the court, as distinguished from one to produce documents
for inspection, would require no consideration of the materiality of those
documents by the court in a civil action.
LIBEL ACTIONS BROUGHT BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS*
TiE guarantee of a free press provided by the First Amendment, though
preventing any previous restraint in times of peace,' has never immunized
the publisher from subsequent liability for false and damaging statements.
The optimum extent of this liability depends upon a balancing of the right
of the individual to his good name against the social need for freedom of
speech. This conflict between individual rights and the needs of a democratic
society is accentuated when a public official claims to have been libeled. His
position makes him a subject of constant discussion because of the special
interest of the community in those who govern it.2 Some limits must never-
theless be imposed, since wholly unrestricted publication of false charges
would exact of the public servant too high a price for the privilege of
service.3
The difficulty of resolving this problem is illustrated by the majority and
dissenting opinions of Sweenev z,. Schenectady Union Publishing Company,4
recently decided by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The plain-
tiff, a Congressman from Ohio, complained of statements appearing in a
syndicated column which the defendant had published in its newspaper.0
The article reported that the Congressman was trying to prevent an appoint-
ment to a United States district court because the proposed appointee was
.,a Jew and one not born in the United States." The plaintiff, bringing
suit throughout the country against publishers in whose newspapers the
article appeared, had been for the most part unsuccessful.0 But a majority
Sweeney v. Schenectad.- Union Publishing Co., 122 F. (2d) 2,8 (C. C. A. 2d,
1941), cert. granted, 62 Sup. Ct. 413 (U. S. 1941).
1. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 713 (1931).
2. See Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 724, 93 Pac. 281, 2 6 (1903).
3. See Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530, 540 (C. C. A. 6th, 1S93).
4. 122 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
5. The alleged libel appeared in "The Washington Merry-Go-Round," written by
Drew Pearson and Robert Allen, and distributed by United Feature Syndicate, Inc., on
December 23, 1941.
6. Complaints in actions brought by the plaintiff were dismissed in Sweeney v.
Capital News Publishing Co., 37 F. Supp. 355 (D. Idaho 1941); Sweeney Y. Beacon
journal Publishing Co., 66 Ohio App. 475, 35 N. E. (2d) 471 (1941), appeal dismisscd,
138 Ohio St. 330, 34 N. E. (2d) 764 (1941); Sweeney v. Newspaper Printing Corp.,
177 Tenn. 197, 147 S. IV. (2d) 406 (1941) ; Sweeney v. Caller-Times Publishing Co., 41
F. Supp. 163 (S. D. Tex. 1941) (subsequent to the decision of the Second Circuit). Mo-
tions to dismiss the complaint were denied, however, by United States district courts
in Arizona, Illinois, Kansas, the Southern District of New York, Vest Virginia, and
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in the Second Circuit, guided by a definition of libel laid down by the New
York Court of Appeals, found the statements capable of conveying a de-
famatory meaning and reversed the district court's order dismissing the
complaint.7
On their face the statements may reasonably be understood to charge that
the plaintiff had engaged in discriminatory conduct motivated by anti-Semitic
prejudice. The article was published at a time when reports of events in
Europe had intensified this country's antipathy to persons practicing or advo-
cating acts of intolerance. It was circulated in a territory where Jews con-
stitute a sizable portion of the population. In view of the time and place
of publication, the charge was held capable of gaining for the plaintiff "the
scorn and contempt of the right-thinking in appreciable numbers."
The majority decided that under the law of New York a publication which
could have this'effect was defamatory per se. The test they adopted was
found in general statements made by the New York Court of Appeals in
two cases which dealt with quite different situations.0 In dissenting, Judge
Clark did not differ with the majority as to the effect of the publication on
the minds of "right-thinking" readers. But he held that the New York
courts had evolved a different test of what is defamatory per se where the
alleged libel concerns a public official- the rule announced in Tanwer v.
Crowley Publishing Corporation that criticism of a public official "may
be captious, ill-timed and without foundation in fact, but, outside of a clear
charge of corruption or gross incompetence holding one tip to disgrace and
contumely, there is no libel."1 0
This "public official rule" of the Tanzer case seems to correspond more
nearly to the actual decisions in cases bearing the closest analogy to the
present one. Public officials have recovered in New York without showing
special damage in actions involving charges of misconduct, corruption, or
Wisconsin. None of these cases has been reported to date; they are listed in Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellant, pp. 13-14, Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Publishing Co., 122 F.
(2d) 288 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
7. For the unreported opinion of the District Court for the Northern District of
New York, see Record on Appeal, p. 18, Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Publishing Co,,
122 F. (2d) 288 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
8. But cf. Sweeney v. Capital News Publishing Co., 37 F. Supp. 355, 357 (D. Idaho
1941), where it was held that the article (lid not expose the plaintiff "to public hatred,
contempt, or ridicule," since opposition to a single political alppointment does not of itself
indicate prejudice against all Jews as a race. In Ohio, the complaint was dismissed on
the ground that to be actionable without an allegation of special damages the alleged
libel must attack the character of the plaintiff, or impute to him immorality or a viola-
tion of the law of the land. Sweeney v. Beacon Journal Publishing Co., 66 Ohio App.
475, 35 N. E. (2d) 471 (1941), appeal dismissed, 138 Ohio St. 330, 34 N. H. (2d) 704
(1941).
9. Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 262 N. Y. 99, 186 N. E, 217
(1933) (newspaper article, stating that woman was courted by murderer, held not libel-
ous) ; Sydney v. MacFadden Newspaper Publishing Corp., 242 N. Y. 208, 151 N. E. 209
(1926) (report that married woman was the "latest ladylove" of actor and about to
marry him, held libelous).
10. 240 App. Div. 203, 205, 268 N. Y. Supp. 620, 622 (4th Dep't 1934).
[Vol. 51
19421 NOTES
incompetence in office." They have not so succeeded where the charge is
one of favoritism or of efforts to shield a client from investigation.' 2 The
effect of the rule is to permit a greater latitude of expression in the case of
men in public office than in the case of private citizens. 3
From a number of viewpoints, much can be said in favor of the result
reached by the majority. In theory at least, the policy of protecting the in-
dividual's right to his good name does not conflict with freedom of speech
defined as "freedom to tell the truth and comment fairly on facts ana not
a license to spread damaging falsehoods in the guise of news gathering and
its dissemination."' 14 Actually, threat of liability may not prevent dissem-
ination of false reports since the possibility of suit is a risk which newspaper
publishers find it necessary to take. The risk, moreover, can be distributed
among readers and advertisers.' 5 The short answer, therefore, to the question
of liability for such reports might be that the public is better able to sustain
the burden than is the individual injured by consequent loss of reputation.
Where the statements in question are of a serious nature and are clearly
libelous without considering extrinsic circumstances, courts have allowed the
11. De Hoyos v. Thornton, 259 App. Div. 1, IS N. Y. S. (2d) 121 (3d Dep't 1940)
(village officials charged with being dictated to by gangsters); Cohalan v. New York
World-Telegram Corp., 172 Misc. 1061, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 706 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (judge
reported unfit for office); Bennet v. Commercial Advertiser Ass'n, 230 X. Y. 125, 129
N. E. 343 (1920) (congressman accused of acting against the public interest and on
behalf of his former client) ; Luan v. Littauer, 187 App. Div. 803, 175 N. Y. Supp. 057
(3d Dep't 1919) (congressman charged wvith being the tool of wartime profiteers); Bing-
ham v. Gaynor, 141 App. Div. 301, 126 N. Y. Supp. 353 (1st Dep't 1910), aff'd, 203 N.
Y. 27, 96 N. E. 84 (1911) (police commissioner accused of corruption, incompetence,
scoundrelism and lawlessness) ; Mattice v. Wilcox, 147 N. Y. 624, 42 X. E. 270 (1895 I
(candidate for public office reported incompetent); Hamilton v. Eu,, S1 N. Y. 110
(1880) (assistant sanitary inspector accused of accepting a bribe); Lewis v. Few, 5
Johns. 1 (N. Y. 1809) (governor accused of criminal and corrupt conduct in office).
See also Sumner v. Liberty Publishing Corp., 240 App. Div. 118, 269 N. Y. Supp. 203 (1st
Dep't 1934); Burnham v. Hornaday, 130 Misc. 207, 223 N. Y. Supp. 750 (Sup. Ct.
1927), mod'd & aff'd, 223 App. Div. 218, 228 N. Y. Supp. 24o (3d Dep't 1923) ; Ho"y
v. New York Times Co., 138 App. Div. 149, 122 N. Y. Supp. 973 (1st Dep't 1910).
But cf. Hall v. Binghampton Press Co., 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 760 (Sup. Ct. 1941), where
an editorial questioning the attitude of a congressman on national defense vas held libel-
ous per se.
12. Tanzer v. Crowley Publishing Corp., 240 App. Div. 203, 26S N. Y. Supp. 020 (4th
Dep't 1934); Hills v. Press Co., 122 Misc. 212, 202 X. Y. Supp. 678 (Sup. Ct. 1924),
aff'd, 214 App. Div. 752, 209 N. Y. Supp. 843 (3d Dep't 1925). See also Gardner v.
Home Life Publications, Inc., 237 App. Div. 200, 2b0 N. Y. Supp. 872 (2d Dep't 1932);
Duffy v. New York Evening Post, 109 App. Div. 471, 96 N. Y. Supp. 629 (Ist Dep't
1905).
13. For dicta that matters of public interest and concern may be freely discusscd
without liability for defamation, see Briarcliff Lodge Hotel, Inc. v. Citizen-Sentinel
Publishers, Inc., 260 N. Y. 106, 118, 183 N. E. 193, 197 (1932); Hoeppner v. DunrIrk
Printing Co., 254 N. Y. 95, 99, 172 N. E. 139, 140 (1930).
14. Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Publishing Co., 122 F. (2d) 28S, 291 (C. C. A.
2d, 1941).
15. See (1933) 81 U. oF PA. L. REv. 779; (1933) 46 HAnv. L. Rzv. 1032.
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plaintiff to recover in the absence of proof of actual injury.10 Although in
specific instances the award of damages is likely to be in the nature of a
windfall,17 this fortuitous element does not diminish the need to compensate
loss of reputation which may well be substantial although not readily sus-
ceptible of evidentiary proof. Loss of reputation is, moreover, no less in-
jurious to public officials than to ordinary individuals. Particularly in the
case of men seeking or holding elective office, it may have serious and far-
reaching consequences. Not only the individuals maligned but the community
as a whole will suffer if deprived of the services of able men through public
distrust caused by dissemination of defamatory matter.
These factors appear to support a policy of strict accountability for the
publication of damaging falsehoods. But truth is sometimes an elusive cri-
terion. The content of daily newspapers is assembled at great speed from
diverse and distant sources. Of necessity it consists in part of reports whose
accuracy cannot readily be ascertained or proved.18 Freedom of expression
is impeded to the extent that reports of this character cannot be published
without threat of liability. This is especially true with respect to statements
concerning public officials. Day by day persons engaged in political activity
arc praised by their adherents and attacked by their adversaries. Accustomed
to read both good and bad reports of its officers, the public may reasonably
be expected to know that both are likely to be biased and exaggerated, and
to give no greater credence to one than to the other. Moreover, through
ready access to the press and special immunity from liability for their own
utterances,' 9 public officials have more opportunity than private individuals
16. Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., 251 N. Y. 250, 167 N. E. 432 (1929).
17. See, e.g., Fisher v. Myers, 339 Mo. 1196, 100 S. W. (2d) 551 (1936) ($125,000
damages) ; Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd., 50 T. L. R. 581 (C. A.
1934) (125,000); Duncan v. Record Publishing Co., 145 S. C. 196, 143 S. E. 31 (1927)
($50,000 damages). In two actions for closely similar publications the same plaintiff
recovered $45,000 and $40,000 respectively in the federal courts. Washington Times Co.
v. Bonner, 86 F. (2d) 836 (App. D. C. 1936); New England Newspaper Publishing Co.
v. Bonner, 77 F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 610 (1935). Evi-
dence that the alleged libel appeared in another newspaper, for which the plaintiff hus
already recovered damages, is inadmissible. Fay v. Brockway Co., 176 App. Div. 255, 112
N. Y. Supp. 1030 (1st Dep't 1917); Palmer v. Matthews, 162 N. Y. 100, 56 N. E. 501
(1900).
18. This is especially true with respect to apparently authentic news items received
by local newspapers from reputable news agencies, as in the Sweeney .case. III Szalay
v. New York American, Inc., 254 App. Div. 249, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 620 (1st Dep't 1938),
(1939) 37 Micu. L. REv. 495, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to compensa-
tory damages, despite the fact that the libelous article was published as a news item
received from a reputable news service. This view is in accord with the weight of author-
ity. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Givens, 67 F. (2d) 62 (C. C. A. 10th, 1933); see
(1938) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 589. Contra: Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 14,
So. 234 (1933).
19. Members of Congress enjoy absolute immunity for statements made in the per-
formance of their legislative function. Cochran v. Couzens, 42 F. (2d) 783 (App. D. C.
1930). The same is true of executive officers of the Government. Glass v. Ickes, IA7 F.
(2d) 273 (App. D. C. 1940). Speeches made by Representative Sweeney in the House
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to make effective denial of unfavorable reports and to counterattack with
impunity. Since the net effect of charges against them can thus be diminished
by methods not available to other persons, it seems fair and perhaps neces-
sary to restrict the category of statements sufficient to support a presumption
of damage in political libel actions.
2 0
For formulating this restriction, an alternative to the public official rule
is available through judicious use of the privilege of fair comment. This is
matter which must be pleaded by the defendant in his answer.21 In most
jurisdictions, including New York, the defense is available only where the
alleged libel is an honest expression of opinion concerning a matter of public
interest, reasonably warranted by facts which must be truly stated. Because
of these prerequisites it is usual for the defendant to use the "rolled-up
plea" - that the statements of fact contained in the publication are true,
and that all other statements therein are fair comments upon these facts.2a
Whether the publication was privileged thus depends upon the public interest
in the subject discussed, the distinction between statements of fact and of
opinion, the truth of the facts, and whether they warrant the comments
which accompany them. In a minority of jurisdictions, however, the privi-
lege of fair comment is extended to misstatements of fact concerning public
officials which the defendant honestly believed to be true.24 The rule stems
from the concept of a duty to report to the public all reasonably reliable
information materially affecting the government of the community.2 5 The
gravity of the charge does not of itself determine liability. The good faith
of the publisher is the operative criterion.
concerning the present litigation [87 Co.NG. REc., Aug. o, 1941, at A4039; 84 Co'aG. R-ec.
6164 (1939)] could be fully reported by New York newspapers ,-ithtut accountability
for libel. N. Y. Civi. Ps.tcr. Acr § 337.
20. "In Texas, a publication concerning a public officer, in order tu be libelous Foer se,
must be of such a character as, if true, would subject him to remtoval from office." Sv;eeney
v. Caller-Times Publishing Co., 41 F. Supp. 163 (S. D. Tem. 1941); Nunn v. Webster,
260 S. NV. 157 (Tem. Comm. App. 1924); but cf. Jenkins v. Taylor, 4 S. W. (2d) 656
(Tem. Civ. App. 1928). In Illinois, a charge of dishonesty or corruption is necesary.
McDonald v. Chicago Daily News Publishing Co., 252 Il1. App. 61 (1929); Davis v.
Ferguson, 246 Ill. App. 318 (1927); cf. City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 Il1. 595,
139 N. E. 86 (1923).
21. Corwin v. Berkwitz, 190 App. Div. 952, 179 N. Y.. Supp. 915 (2d Dep't 1920).
But when the public nature of the occasion appears on the face of the complaint, the law
of fair comment applies. In that event the defendant need not plead the privilege. Kenna
v. New York Daily Mirror, Inc., 250 App. Div. 625, 295 N. Y. Supp. 219 (1st Dep't
1937), 6 Foan. L. Rxv. 477.
22. Washington Times Co. v. Bonner, 86 F. (2d) 836 (App. D. C. 1936); Briar-
cliff Lodge Hotel v. Citizen Sentinel Publishers, Inc., 260 N. Y. 10t), 183 N. E. 193
(1932); Foley v. Press Publishing Co., 226 App. Div. 535, 235 N. Y. Supp. 340 (1t
Dep't 1929).
23. See GArnrY, LME AND SLA'NDR (O'Sullivans cd. 1933) 533.
24. Clancy v. Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1, 277 N. IA. 264 (1933); Steenson
v. Wallace, 144 Kan. 730, 62 Pac. (2d) 907 (1936); Lafferty v. Houlihan, 81 N. H. 67,
121 Atl. 92 (1923); Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 193 Pac. 1 (1921);
McLean v. Merriman, 42 S. D. 394, 175 N. W. 878 (1920).
25. See Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 723, 93 Pac. 281, 287 (1903).
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Of the three possible methods of limiting liability for statements about men
in public life, the limited privilege of fair comment prevailing in a majority
of jurisdictions is the most complicated. In many instances it forces the
issues of the alleged libel to trial, bringing into immediate relevancy con-
siderations of "privilege," "truth" and the like. On occasion the rolled-up
plea may be necessary in order to justify an imputation of corrupt or dis-
honorable motives by showing that it is a reasonable inference from facts
which have been truly stated.206 But where no such imputation can be gathered
from the publication, the plea is a needlessly circuitous method of establishing
that the language used is not in itself defamatory of a public official. Those
few jurisdictions, on the other hand, which extend the doctrine of .fair com-
ment to include the basic fact statements appear to be the most liberal.
It can be argued that since the public is more immediately concerned with
the criminal or corrupt practices of its officers than with their less venal
offenses, reports of the former should be those free from liability if published
in good faith.21 The objection to this view, however, lies in the difficulty
of proving good faith. If it is to be tested objectively by the presence or
absence of probable grounds for the publisher's belief,28 the sufficiency of the
defense is likely to depend upon whether a reasonable man would have been
satisfied that the statements published were true. Hence the evidentiary
problem on trial is only slightly less complex than that involved in setting
up the defense of fair comment under the majority rule. If, on the other
hand, the minority rule takes the form of placing the burden upon the plain-
tiff to prove actual malice,29 recovery is made virtually impossible.
Unlike the defense of fair comment, the public official rule is directed
solely and immediately to the sufficiency of the complaint. The court must
here determine, not broadly whether the article published by the defendant
is capable -of a defamatory meaning, but more narrowly whether it defames
the plaintiff. Liability will depend upon the gravity of the charge. At the
initial stage of the proceedings, before truth or good faith becomes an issue,
the rule eliminates libel actions brought by political office-holders where
the language complained of is insufficient to support a presumption of damage
as to them. Thus its operation reduces the need for complicated pleadings
and proof on the part of the defendant. Moreover, it provides a clear and
simple guide for the courts and for the public.
From this point of view, the opinion of the majority fails to meet the
dissent. It ignores the public official rule and omits discussion of the authority
and of the policy which support it. In the light of this rule and of statements
concerning public officials considered in previous New York decisions, the
charges published by the defendant were not sufficient to sustain a presump-
26. See GATLEY, LiBEL AND SLANDER (O'Sullivan's ed. 1938) 382.
27. See Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 576, 198 Pac. 1, 5 (1921).
28. Lafferty v. Houlihan, 81 N. H. 67, 121 Atl. 92 (1923). In California, the de-
fendant has the burden of proving the absence of actual malice. Snively v. Record Pub-
lishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 Pac. 1 (1921).
29. Clancy v. Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1, 277 N. W. 264 (1938) ; Steenson v.
Wallace, 144 Kan. 730, 62 Pac. (2d) 907 (1936).
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tion of damage in favor of the plaintiff. 30 It may be that the decision of
the majority was induced by a belief that charges of anti-Semitism tend to
inflame and divide public opinion and should therefore be discouraged. There
is, however, no unanimity of opinion on this score. On the contrary, the
belief is widely held that the best way to deal with intolerance is to expose
and denounce it. In any event, it is questionable whether courts should use
actions for libel as a means of embarking upon censorship of tile press.
EFFECT OF PARDONS FOR INNOCENCE UNDER
"HABITUAL CRIMINAL" STATUTES*
As long as the administration of justice remains in the hands of imperfect
humans, innocent men will occasionally be erroneously convicted of crime.1
Upon discovery of such error the wronged individual is entitled to a judicial
reversal of his conviction, in addition to restitution of any fine he may have
paid and compensation for the indignities and suffering he has undergone.2
In contrast to Continental jurisprudence, however, American law exhibits
a peculiar apathy to the predicament of the wrongfully convicted.a This
indifference may be largely attributed to the prevailing theory that judg-
ments should not be forever subject to review, but should be final after
an ascertained interval - ordinarily term time.4 Consequently, courts cannot
reopen most cases whenever an erroneous conviction becomes apparent.
Instead, that task has been left to the executive in the exercise of his pardon-
ing power.5
Pardons may also be granted by the executive for reasons other than
innocence, but courts generally have failed to distinguish the two types with
respect to their consequences.0 MIany courts consider a pardon to "blot
30. Under the law of New York, a publication not defamatory on its face is not
actionable without an allegation of special damages. National Variety Artists, Inc. v.
'Mosconi, 169 Misc. 982, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 498 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Kuln v. Veloz, 252 App.
Dix% 515, 299 N. Y. Supp. 924 (Ist Dep't 1037) ; O'Cunnell v. Press Publilhing Co., 214
N. Y. 352, 108 N. E. 556 (1915).
* People ex rel. Prisament v. Brophy, 38 N. E. (2d) 46S (1941).
1. See BoRcH\ARD. CONVICTIGx THE INNOCENT (1932).
2. See Barnett, The Grounds of Pardon h the Courts (1910) 20 YALE L. J. 131,
132.
3. See BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 1, at 375 c seq.
4. See Weihofen, Pardon: An Extraordinarv Remedy (1940) 12 Roc:v Mr. L.
Ray. 112, 118-19. England has been deemed as indifferent as the United States to erro-
neous convictions, but the English criminal procedure is somewhat more liberal titan
that in this country. See Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Ont Guilt? (1915) 28 Htmv.
L. REv. 647, 659. A few American courts. however, may grant a new trial, no matter
how much time has passed. State v. David, 14 S. C. 42- (1881).
5. For history of pardon see 3 .XTa-oRE GENaa.XL'S SUtRV' oF RELFASF PrQcMa-
uREs (1939) 1 et seq.
6. See Weihofen, The Effect of a Pardon (1939) 88 U. OF PA. L. RE,. 177, 192.
1942]
[Vol. 51THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
out" guilt and to make the recipient "as innocent as if he had never com-
mitted the offense." 7 Other courts, however, have said that the acceptance
of a pardon implies guilt.8 Tribunals favoring the "blotting-out" theory
have emphasized the fact that pardons may be granted for innocence. The
implication-of-guilt theory, on the other hand, is supported by the argument
that most pardons are granted not for innocence but for reasons of clemency.0
But neither theory can properly be all-inclusive. A pardon for innocence
is an executive finding of the absence of guilt and should render the pardoned
person as legally innocent as if he had never been convicted. 10 In the case
of a pardon for other reasons, however, since the recipient was not innocent
in the first place, the fact of the crime should not be obliterated; only the
punishment and the legal consequences of conviction should be removed.1'
This distinction is useful, for example, in determining the effect to be
given pardons under "habitual criminal" or "second offender" statutes." These
laws provide that repeating offenders should be subject to increased punish-
ment, with the dual purpose of dissuading criminals from further wrong-
doing and of removing the habituals from society for longer periodsY' A
convict, pardoned for any reason other than innocence, would seem, upon
committing a second crime, to fall within the category of habitual criminals
and, therefore, to be subject to increased punishment. Yet, the courts are not
agreed as to whether the pardoned offense should be counted. One line
of authority holds that, since only the second offense is being punished,
the pardon, for the first has no effect on that punishment.1 4 Other juris-
7. The statement was first made in Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333. 380 (U. S.
1866). For cases repeating it see 3 Ar'roR.NEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF REILEASE PRocEra
VRES (1939) 267, n. 3.
8. See Burdick v. United States, 236 U. S. 79, 91 (1915) ; Roberts v. State, 160
N. Y. 217, 221, 54 N. E. 678, 679 (1899).
9. See 3 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEAS4E PROCEDURES (1939) 293.
10. See Lattin, The Pardoning Power in Massachusetts (1931) 11 IB. U. L. REv.
505, 520.
11. \Villiston has stated the generally accepted rule for the effect of such pardons
as follows: "The pardon removes all legal punishment for the offence. Therefore if the
mere conviction involves certain disqualifications which would not follow from the com-
mission of the crime without conviction, the pardon removes such disqualifications, On
the other hand, if character is a necessary qualification and the commission of a crime
would disqualify even though there had been no criminal prosecution for the crime, the
fact that the criminal has been convicted and pardoned does not make him any more
eligible." Williston, supra note 4, at 653.
12. Such statutes are constitutional. Graham v. \Vest Virginia, 224 U. S. 610
(1912) ; McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311 (1901) ; see Note (1929) 58 A.
L. R. 20.
13. See (1936) 5 FORDHAM L. REv. 166.
14. People v. Biggs, 9 Cal. (2d) 508, 71 P. (2d) 214 (1937) ; People v. Dutton,
9 Cal. (2d) 505, 71 P. (2d) 218 (1937) ; Herndon v. Commonwealth, 105 Ky. 197, 48
S. W. 989 (1899); Mount v. Commonwealth, 63 Ky. 93 (1865); People ex rd, Mal-
strom v. Kaiser, 135 Misc. 67, 236 N. Y. Supp. 619 (Sup. Ct. 1929), (1930) 14 MINN.
L. REV. 293; People v. Carlesi, 154 App. Div. 481, 139 N. Y. Supp. 309 (1st Dep't 1913),
13 COL. L. REV. 418, aff'd, 208 N. Y. 547, 101 N. E. 1114 (1913), aff'd sub nor, Carlesi
NOTES
dictions, however, adhere to the rule that the pardon forbids taking into
account the earlier offense, 15 either because the pardon blots out the first
crime,16 or because the increased punishment for the later offense is one
of the legal consequences removed by a pardon.17 Since none of the past
cases arising under habitual criminal statutes have involved a pardon granted
for reasons of innocence, 8 the cases which have given effect to pardoned
convictions are more persuasive. 19
The question of the effect to be given a pardon for innocence under an
habitual criminal law arose for the first time in the recent case of People
ex rel. Prisanzent v. BrophV. 2 The court held that the conviction, although
pardoned, should increase the punishment. Relator was convicted in New
York of attempted robbery. He was accused of having been convicted
formerly in a United States District Court of bank robbery and so was
sentenced as a second offender. By a writ of habeas corpus, however, the
power of the court to sentence him to increased punishment was questioned
on the ground that he had been given a full and unconditional pardon by
the President of the United States, who found that he was innocent.21 The
Appellate Division upheld his claim,2 2 but was reversed by the Court of
Appeals.
The court, while admitting the injustice of its result, followed essentially
the reasoning of cases in which pardons were granted for reasons other than
innocence. The statute, according to the court, provided an inflexible rule
by the terms of which the President's pardoning power could not be used
to eradicate guilt, but only to remove the legal consequences of a judgment
of guilt. Only a judicial finding of innocence made by a court of proper
N% New York, 233 U. S. 51 (1914); Commonwealth .r rel. v. Smith, 324 Pa. 73, 187
At. 387 (1936); Commonwealth v. Vitale, 35 Lack. 85 (Pa. 1933); State v. Edel-
stein, 146 Wash. 221, 262 Pac. 622 (1927); see State v. Webb, 36 N. D. 235, 243, 1102
N. W. 358, 361 (1917); 19 Or. ATT'y GEN. OF AVIs. 139 (1930); 2- id. 109 (1933).
15. Kelley v. State, 204 Ind. 612, 185 N. E. 453 (1933); State v. Lee, 171 La. 744,
132 So. 219 (1931); State v. Martin, 59 Ohio St. 212. 52 N. E. 185 (1893); State v.
Anderson, 7 Ohio N. P. 562 (1896) ; Freeman v. State, 118 Tem. Cr. 67, 39 S. NV. (24)
895 (1931); Scrivnor v. State, 113 Tex. Cr. 194, 20 S. W. (2d) 416 (1929), (1930) 14
MIm. L. REv. 293; Edwards v. Comnouwealth, 78 Va. 39 (1883) ; ee Tucker v. State,
14 Okla. Cr. 54, 64, 167 Pac. 637, 640 (1917).
16. See, e.g., Edwards v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 39, 41 (183).
17. See, e.g., Scrivnor v. State, 113 Tex. Cr. 194, 197, 20 S. W. (2d) 416, 417
(1929); cf. Sanders v. State, 108 Tex. Cr. 467, 471, 1 S. AN. (2d) 901, 903 (1923)
(same reasoning where question was effect of pardoned conviction un suspended sen-
tence).
18. See Weihofen, supra note 6, at 186.
19. Texas courts have held, in other places, that the increased punishment is solely
for the second offense. Arnold v. State, 127 Tex. Cr. 84. 74 S. W. (2d) 997 (19341;
Kinney v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 500, 78 S. AV. 225 (1904).
20. 38 N. E. (2d) 468 (1941).
21. The finding was based upon indisputable proof that the crine had been coni-
mitted by other persons.
22. People ex rel. Prisament v. Brophy, 261 App. Div. 495, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 193
(4th Dep't 1941).
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jurisdiction, the court held, would operate to wipe out conviction for the
purposes of the habitual criminal statute. The court conceded that, ideally,
a person should be able to prove his innocence before such a tribunal; but,
in the absence of such procedure, or a statute providing that the executive
finding should have the effect of a judicial acquittal, it deemed itself power-
less to mitigate the punishment prescribed by the legislature. Redress must
be sought from the executive, not the courts. 23
The manifest injustice of the result reached in the Prisanent case indicates
the need for machinery to correct the unfair consequences of erroneous con-
victions. As the court pointed out, the innocent man could, when justified
by the facts, be given the benefit of liberalized criminal procedure in order
to present proof of his innocence to a proper court.2 4 An alternative solution
is embodied. in statutes adopted by the Federal Government and by several
states to compensate one erroneously convicted.2" Under such laws the de-
cision of the body authorized to hear the innocent man's claim for indemnity
constitutes the required judicial determination. 26 In the principal case, how-
ever, relator was prevented from obtaining statutory compensation by a
technicality 27 requiring compliance with certain statutory conditions addi-
tional to presentation of an executive pardon for innocence. Other possible
remedies include a statute, such as that of Iowa, expressly providing that
convictions pardoned for innocence should not be considered under habitual
criminal laws ;28 and, finally, the executive reduction of sentence proposed
by the New York court.
But even without any of these devices courts should be able to reach a
just result by recognizing the distinction between pardons for innocence
and pardons for other reasons.20 The executive finding of innocence has'
been criticized as a non-judicial determination. 0 But even the most devoted
23. Compare (1930) 14 MIN. L. REv. 293, 294.
24. See Williston, supra note 4, at 660.
25. 52 STAT. 438 (1938), 18 U. S. C. §§ 729-32 (1940); CAL.Fr. PFNy. Coric (1941)
§§ 4900-06; LAWS OF N. D. (Supp. 1925) §§ 11269bl-b6; WIs. STATS. (1939) § 285.05,
as amended by LAWS OF WIS., 1941, c. 301, § 1. See Borchard, State Indeitilily for
Errors of Criminal Justice (1941) 21 B. U. L. RFv. 201 (with model bill based on Fed-
eral Act).
26. Under the federal law the hearing is before the Court of Claims. Administra-
tive boards, variously constituted, hear the claims in the three states, with the findings
and awards subject to review on appeal to a court in North Dakota and Wisconsin.
Wisconsin further provides a final appeal to the supreme court of the state. See note 25
supra.
27. Relator, because of possession at the time of.arrest of firearnts, ammunition,
money sacks of the type commonly used by bank robbers, and stolen automobile license
plates, was unable to make the required recital that he did not "either intentionally, or
by wilful misconduct, or negligence" contribute to his arrest. See 58 STAT. 438, § 2(c)
(1938), 18 U. S. C. §730(c) (1940).
28. IOWA CODE (Reichmann, 1939) § 13402.





adherence to the principle of the separation of powers3 should not preclude
recognition that the executive is in a very good position to judge the guilt
or innocence of a person seeking a pardon. 32 Especially because the executive
alone can grant a pardon, courts should give full force and effect to a pardon
for innocence and should acknowledge that an erroneous conviction of that
t3e has no legal consequences whatever. 33
31. See People v. Carlesi, 154 App. Div. 481, 487, 139 N. Y. Supp. 309, 313 (lst
Dep't 1913), affd, 208 N. Y. 547, 101 N. E. 1114 (1913), affd sub nora. Carlesi v. Ne.
York, 233 U. S. 51 (1914).
32. See description of pardoning procedure in 3 ArTron-%- G *nLEAL's Sunm', 0,F
RELEASE PROCEDURES (1939) 155 ct seq. See also Humbert, The Fcdcral Pardoning
Process (1941) 27 VA. L. R '. 481.
33. See comments of Chief Judge Cardozo in Matter of Kaufmann, 245 X. Y. 423,
428-31, 157 N. E. 730, 732-33 (1927).
